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Kevin E. Mohr*
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ToA CIVIL ACTION
A student's performance in law school does not necessarily indi-
cate whether the student will be a good lawyer. Nor will a student's
enjoyment of law school portend that she will enjoy the practice of
law. Being a lawyer is not simply being able to cogently analyze a set
of facts. The practice of law does not ebb and flow with the regularity
of law school semesters or quarters. You do not receive grades at
regular intervals, nor does your work come in nicely discrete packets
with foreseeable termination dates. Rather, you prove you can "be a
lawyer" by diligently representing your clients year after year, often
feeling fatigued and enduring acrimonious interactions with opposing
counsel, yet still maintaining your ethical and moral compass.
As a litigator or trial lawyer, you usually cannot predict the slack
periods when you can sit back and reflect on what you are doing, as
you might between semesters while still in school. Even under the
most strict judge, you cannot always predict when a trial will end (or
even begin) or a case will settle. Even if you could, usually several
other cases await your immediate attention once it does. Intense peri-
ods of trial preparation and trial can last for months; during many
stretches you have to work most weekends just to keep on top of your
cases. This preoccupation with your clients' matters is especially true
when your efforts are focused on a single case, as illustrated in Jona-
than Harr's A Civil Action.1
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1. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (First Vintage Books ed. 1996). All page refer-
ences in this Article are to this edition of the book.
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Harr's book dramatically describes how a case can consume a
lawyer's life to the exclusion of all else. The book describes lawyers'
pursuit and defense of a toxic tort case that arose out of events in the
town of Woburn, Massachusetts. A statistically high number of chil-
dren and adults, all of whom drank water from the town's wells, con-
tracted leukemia. After determining that runoff from land owned by
W.R. Grace & Co. and a subsidiary of Beatrice Foods may have pol-
luted the wells, a Boston personal injury lawyer, Jan Schlictmann,
together with a public interest organization, Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice (TPLJ), filed suit on behalf of these Woburn residents (the
Woburn plaintiffs) against Grace and Beatrice. The book recounts
the problems the plaintiffs' lawyers confronted, not only in trying to
prove their case, but also in trying to overcome the formidable
defenses prepared by the principal lawyers for the defendants, Wil-
liam Cheeseman for Grace and Jerome Facher for Beatrice. Covering
the case from the filing of the complaint to posttrial maneuvers over
alleged discovery abuses, the book also devotes substantial space to the
interactions among the lawyers and between the lawyers and the judge
who presided over the case, United States District Judge Walter
Skinner.
Lawyers identify with this book, perhaps because, after an
opening section describing the families and their injuries, the narrative
presents the pursuit of the case almost exclusively from the lawyers'
perspective. The book is not episodic entertainment like "L.A. Law."
A Civil Action does not take place in a world where the firm's law
library functions primarily as a setting for interpersonal squabbles or
late-night trysts. Instead, it is a place of half-eaten meals at the office,
documents and files occupying any horizontal surface, and clothes
worn a second day. In scene after scene, the book depicts the sus-
tained pressure and the frustrations and doubts that can overwhelm a
lawyer as he pursues his client's claims.
The book also depicts a world that can leave the reader with the
impression that ethics took a holiday during the Woburn case, proba-
bly because it ends with the posttrial motions over the concealment of
the Yankee Environmental Engineering Report2 and Riley's destruc-
tion of evidence.3 The reader is left with the feeling that had this
2. HARR, supra note 1, at 459-61. This was an environmental report that John Riley,
president of Beatrice's subsidiary, the J. Riley Tannery, had commissioned to investigate the
migration of waste from the tannery property to the city wells. The report supported the predic-
tions that Schlictmann's expert Pinder had made at trial. Id. at 460. Although the report had
been completed three years before trial, defendant Beatrice never produced it during discovery
despite Judge Skinner's finding that Schlictmann had properly requested it. Id. at 464.
3. Id. at 469-87. In 1983, after Schlictmann had filed the complaint and three years before
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information been available to plaintiffs' lawyer Schlictmann before or
during the trial, the jury would have reached a substantially different
verdict, or the case would have settled for substantially more money.
While these two events are the most conspicuous, many other inci-
dents in the book, both peripheral to and related directly to the
Woburn case, are rich sources of material for educating students about
legal ethics.4 Yet despite the impression a reader may have that justice
was subverted, the lawyers in A Civil Action generally comported
themselves within the strictures of the ethical codes.
In writing this Article, however, my intent is neither to vindicate
nor to rebuke the lawyers involved in the Woburn case. Instead, I
want to show how A Civil Action can be used to supplement a course
in Professional Responsibility.
One law professor reports that the first time he taught Profes-
sional Responsibility he asked his students what they wanted to get
out of the course. They stated three concerns: "First, they wanted to
know what they needed to do to pass the professional responsibility
bar exam. Second, they wanted to know what they needed to know to
stay clear of trouble in practicing law. Third, they were concerned
with their grades."'  In teaching Professional Responsibility, I have
had much the same experience. I address the second concern by
exposing the students, through oral and written hypotheticals, to the
kinds of ethical dilemmas they eventually will confront in their prac-
tices. According to student feedback, this approach not only has
helped prepare them for practice, but also has helped allay their first
concern.
6
A Civil Action contains many events that can similarly be used to
introduce students to ethical dilemmas they will confront when they
enter the profession. These events can breathe life into otherwise dry
the trial, Riley had hired a waste removal company to remove several truckloads of material from
the 15-acre piece of property between the tannery and the city wells. He testified during trial
that he had not removed anything from that property. Id. at 473. During the hearing on
destruction of evidence, he admitted he had lied during trial. Id. at 482.
4. An example of an incident that is collateral to the Woburn case but is still a rich source
of material for an ethics discussion is Schlictmann's handling of the Eaton matter, the first case
he took to trial. See infra Part III. An example of an incident that is central to the main events of
the book, especially as it set the tone for the relationships between and among the lawyers and
the judge and established the extent to which the lawyers would act as advocates for their client,
is the first Rule 11 hearing on barratry. See infra Part IV.
5. Linda Morton et al., Not Quite Grown Up: The Difficulty of Applying an Adult Education
Model to Legal Externs, 5 CLINICAL L. REv. 469, 506 n.129 (Spring 1999) (citing comment by
Gary Friedman in PROJECT FOR THE STUDY AND APPLICATION OF HUMANISTIC EDU-
CATION IN THE LAW, HUMANISTIC EDUCATION IN LAW, MONOGRAPH 1 (1980) (reassessing
law schooling)).
6. As for resolving their third concern, grades, I leave that up to the students themselves.
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discussions of acceptable ethical behavior as set out in ethical codes.
In accord with the Lessons from Woburn Project's goal to make A
Civil Action and its associated materials into a powerful teaching tool,
the book's events vividly illustrate the ethical parameters within which
a lawyer must operate, ethical parameters that exist regardless of how
tired a lawyer may be or how antagonistic the opposing party may act.
Part II contains a brief overview of the mechanisms for regulat-
ing lawyers' conduct, the various responsibilities and functions a law-
yer holds within our legal system, and the lawyer's professional duties.
After this brief overview, I discuss in depth several events in the book
that illustrate the roles and duties a lawyer has, and what a lawyer
should do in each event to fulfill her ethical obligations. Part III pre-
sents an event collateral to the Woburn case, Schlictmann's first trial,
and raises issues of the lawyer's duty of competence and the funda-
mental division of authority and responsibility between lawyer and cli-
ent in achieving the aims of the representation. Part IV focuses on the
Rule 11 hearing where Schlictmann contested allegations of barratry.
This part of the Article demonstrates the difference between the attor-
ney-client privilege and the lawyer's duty of confidentiality, two fun-
damental ethical concepts many practicing lawyers confuse, and which
can also serve as a springboard for a classroom discussion of the place
morality holds in the legal profession. Moreover, it reminds students
that common sense need not be left at the courthouse door.
Part V follows up on the theme of morals in the legal profession.
It uses the false deposition testimony of Barbas to introduce the classic
conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of cli-
ents and as an officer of the legal system. It also familiarizes the stu-
dent with how lawyers may say or do one thing, but intend something
entirely different. Finally, Part VI discusses legal fees, a topic dear to
the hearts of most lawyers and central to A Civil Action. This part also
introduces the kind of ethical ramifications that exist when a lawyer
professionally associates with nonlawyers to create a multidisciplinary
practice. The current ABA President has identified this issue as the
most important issue facing the legal profession today.'
The reader must remember that in some of these events, par-
ticularly the scenes that take place in the courtroom or between the
lawyers, the book is generous with details that permit a discussion of
the ethics within the context of the actual events.' In other instances,
7. See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, General Information Form, at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpgeninfo.html>. The Commissioner's Report on Multidisci-
plinary Practice and supporting documents can be found at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mdpfinalreport.html>.
8. See infra Parts IV.A., V.A., VI.
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however, the book is spare about what actually occurred. Not sur-
prisingly, this occurs most often when lawyer-client communications
are involved.9 In those situations, one can hypothesize about what
may have happened and whether it comports with a lawyer's ethical
duties." Alternatively, the events can function as vehicles that can be
used to segue into other related topics in ethics. Taken as a whole,
they demonstrate that A Civil Action can be used not only to illustrate
a lawyer's ethical obligations, but also as springboards to discussions
of more general ethical and professional concerns. These discussions
will demonstrate that A Civil Action is a rich repository with which to
supplement a course in legal ethics."
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
To better understand the ethical issues that arise in A Civil
Action, it is helpful to briefly review the sources of regulation of the
legal profession, the different roles and responsibilities a lawyer has
within the legal system, the adversarial nature of that legal system, and
the duties a lawyer owes, not only to his client, but also to the legal
system.
A. Sources of Regulation of the Legal Profession
The legal profession is self-regulated, primarily through the vari-
ous codes of professional conduct the states have adopted during this
century.12 The codes, which generally set forth minimally acceptable
9. See infra Part III.A.3.
10. I have relied exclusively on the book's descriptions of events. As more materials from
the case become widely available, it will be possible to supplement these descriptions for a more
complete discussion of the issues. See, e.g., LEWIS A. GROSSMAN AND ROBERT G. VAUGHN,
A DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVIL ACTION (1999) (containing the pleadings and
other materials from the Woburn litigation).
11. My involvement with A Civil Action as a teaching tool began in Fall 1998 when I pre-
pared a handout for a panel discussion on "Professional Ethics and A Civil Action" at Western
State University College of Law. The panel, consisting of several distinguished judges and law-
yers, appeared before the law school's first year students, all of whom were required to purchase
and read the book before as part of their Professional Skills course. The handout addresses more
ethical issues arising in many other events in A Civil Action than there is space to discuss in this
Article. It is available at <http://www.wsulaw.edu/general/index.htm> or by requesting a copy
from the author.
12. For a general discussion of the regulation of the legal profession, see generally
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2 (1986). As Wolfram notes, lawyers are
regulated not only through the formal mechanisms of bar discipline, but also through, inter alia,
the inherent powers of courts to regulate lawyers, federal antitrust laws, and malpractice actions.
Id. at 20-21. In addition, Wolfram observes that there are informal mechanisms, such as "nega-
tive publicity and other expressions of peer disapproval, the cutoff of valuable practice opportu-
nities (firm membership or referral business), denial of access to centers of power and prestige
(bar association committee membership and officership), and preclusion from judicial posts." Id.
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conduct for lawyers, are a means for determining a lawyer's liability
for professional discipline. There are three different ethical codes cur-
rently in force: The American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 13 the American Bar Association Model Code of
Professional Responsibility,14 and the Rules of Professional Conduct
of the State Bar of California.15 Every state has adopted one or some
variation of these codes.
The first, the Model Rules, has been adopted in over forty
states.1 6  Because of their predominance, I will primarily use the
Model Rules in analyzing the events in A Civil Action.17 California is
alone in having its own code of lawyer conduct, all of the other states
at 22.
13. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
14. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE]. The Model Code is divided into Canons, each of which expresses "in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, with
the legal system, and with the legal profession." MODEL CODE Preamble. For example, Canon
4 of the Model Code states, "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a
Client." Each Canon in turn is subdivided into a number of Ethical Considerations (EC) and
Disciplinary Rules (DR). The Ethical Considerations are "aspirational in character and repre-
sent the objective toward which every member of the profession should strive." MODEL CODE
Preamble. The words "may" and "should," implying that the statement is precatory rather than
mandatory, pervade most of the Ethical Considerations. Disciplinary Rules, on the other hand,
are mandatory in character. They "state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer
can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." MODEL CODE Preamble. For example,
DR 4-101(B)(1) provides that "[e]xcept when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not
knowingly... [r]eveal a confidence or secret of his client." (emphasis added).
15. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA (1989)
[hereinafter CAL. RULES].
16. Although an ABA Commission drafted, and the ABA House of Delegates approved,
both the Model Code and the Model Rules, a code must first be adopted by a state legislature or
the state's highest court before it functions as a measure of attorney liability for discipline.
17. In doing so, I realize that Massachusetts did not adopt the Model Rules until 1997,
effective January 1, 1998. See MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. COURT RULE 3:07 (Rules of Professional
Conduct and Comments, Preamble, & Scope). Thus, when the events of the Woburn case
occurred, the Model Code was not in force in Massachusetts. Nevertheless, because the majority
of law students will practice under the Model Rules, I will use them as the primary source for the
analyses that follow, but will also refer to the California Rules and Model Code where applicable.
One final note is in order here. In 1997, the ABA created the Ethics 2000 Commission, to com-
prehensively review and student the Model Rules. The Ethics 2000 Commission is charged with
the following:
1) conducting a comprehensive study and evaluation of the ethical and professional-
ism precepts of the legal profession; 2) examining and evaluating the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and the rules governing professional conduct in the
state and federal jurisdictions; 3) conducting original research, surveys and hearings;
and 4) formulating recommendations for action.
See Ethics 2000 Home Page, <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html>. Although the ABA
has cautioned it has no intention to abandon the Model Rules, id., the Commission's review and
study of the current rules and practices in the states probably will result in some proposed sub-
stantial changes to the current rules. The Commission's final report is scheduled for release in
the year 2000. Id.
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and the District of Columbia having adopted either the Model Rules
or the ABA code. I will also regularly refer to the California Rules in
analyzing the events.'" In addition to the Model Rules, the California
Rules, and the ABA code, a lawyer's duties may also be found in state
statutes and under other more generally-applicable areas of law, such
as the law of agency and the law of fiduciaries. 9
B. The Lawyer's Responsibilities and Roles Within the Legal System
A lawyer wears several hats within the legal system. Not only
does the lawyer represent clients, but she is also an officer of the legal
system and a "public citizen having special responsibility for the qual-
ity of justice."" In representing a client, a lawyer can perform various
functions: advisor, advocate, negotiator, intermediary, and evalua-
tor.2 ' Although we see lawyers performing each of the first three
functions in A Civil Action, we primarily remember them as advocates
for their clients-advocates devising their respective strategies and
arguing their clients' positions to each other or before Judge Skinner or
the jury. Given the adversarial model upon which the American sys-
tem of justice is based, it should not surprise us that the lawyers' roles
as advocates for their clients predominate in A Civil Action.
C. The Adversary System
The United States has an adversary system under which the par-
ties to a dispute each present to a trier of fact, traditionally a jury, their
versions of facts underlying the dispute. Under the adversary model,
the fact trier then distills the true facts from the parties' different ver-
18. Aside from a certain parochialism, my decision to use the California Rules rests on the
large number of California law students and the fact that the State of California is home to more
lawyers than any other state.
19. In particular, California has the State Bar Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6228
(1990), which includes provisions setting forth ethical duties that govern lawyer conduct. See,
e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (which sets forth a lawyer's duty not to disclose a cli-
ent's confidential information, a duty that is set out in both the Model Rules and Model Code,
but is not included in the California Rules).
20. MODEL RULES Preamble para. 1.
21. The Preamble to the Model Rules discusses these various functions:
As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's
legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a
lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.
As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with
requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer
seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a
spokes[person] for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.
MODEL RULES Preamble para. 2.
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22sions of the same story. To ensure that the adversary system func-
tions properly and the parties are able to present their arguments to
the trier of fact persuasively, each is represented by a trained advocate:
a lawyer. The advocate's job is not to reconcile her client's version of
the facts with the opposing party's version, but rather to convince the
trier of fact to adopt her client's version.
23
D. Duties of a Lawyer to the Client
Fundamental to the adversary system is the requirement that a
lawyer must serve her client with absolute loyalty. As the client's
advocate, the lawyer effectively steps into the client's shoes. Unless
her loyalty is undivided, unless all her resources at that moment in
time are devoted to the client's interests, she cannot be an effective
advocate. Thus, the justice system presupposes the lawyer's undi-
vided loyalty to her client.24
1. The Duties of Loyalty and Confidentiality
Because of its centrality to the effective functioning of the adver-
sarial justice system, the duty of loyalty is arguably the most funda-
mental of the lawyer's duties.25 The ethical codes identify a number of
other duties that foster the duty of loyalty. First, as already noted, a
lawyer is expected to be a zealous advocate for her client.2 ' Addition-
ally, to be an effective advocate, the lawyer must be both competent
27
and diligent. 2' To help the lawyer represent the client competently
22. See DAVID A. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 50-103 (1988),
for a discussion and criticism of the underlying rationale for the adversary system.
23. The Preamble to the Model Rules notes: "[W]hen an opposing party is well repre-
sented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that
justice is being done." MODEL RULES Preamble para. 7. In short, aside from making her cli-
ent's argument, the lawyer need not concern herself with the effectiveness of the system so long
as the other party has a lawyer.
24. In the last two decades or so, a number of commentators have questioned the view that
the adversary system requires rigid adherence to the client's position even if that will result in
injustice prevailing in a particular case. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 22, at 322-35; Deborah L.
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 592 (1985); William H.
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
25. See, e.g., State Bar of Cal. Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, CAL
1987-93 (1987); CAL 1984-83 (1984).
26. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
27. "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representa-
tion requires legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation." MODEL RULES Rule 1.1. See also CAL. RULES Rule 3-110; MODEL CODE
DR 6-101. See also infra Part III.A.
28. The Model Rules require that a lawyer "act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client." MODEL RULES Rule 1.3. The California Rules include diligence in
the definition of competence: "For purposes of this rule, 'competence' in any legal service shall
290
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and diligently, the lawyer is expected to become familiar with the
facts. The lawyer can obtain some of this information independently,
but the natural starting point for a lawyer to familiarize herself with a
matter is the client. The attorney-client privilege, 9 combined with the
lawyer's further duty of confidentiality (i.e., the duty not to disclose
the client's confidential information)," assures the client that her
communications will remain private and helps the lawyer to master
the case.3' In addition to these duties, the various rules governing
conflicts of interest further ensure the lawyer's duty of loyalty remains
undivided and her zealous advocacy not jeopardized.32
2. The Duty to Communicate and Allocation of Authority Between
Client and Lawyer
Communication is essential to the effective representation of a
client. The Model Rules recognize that "[b]oth lawyer and client have
authority and responsibility in the objectives and means of represen-
tation"; the lawyer generally makes tactical decisions, while the client
makes decisions on issues that are dispositive of the case.33 To ensure
the proper allocation of authority and responsibility between client
and lawyer, the client must be kept informed so he can make the dis-
positive decisions that he alone has the authority to make. These deci-
sions include all decisions that affect the resolution of the case or
otherwise affect the client's substantive rights, such as the decision to
settle the case or to plead guilty.34 Consequently, the lawyer has a
mean to apply the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental, emotional, and physical abil-
ity reasonably necessary for the performance of such service." CAL. RULES Rule 3-110(B). See
also MODEL CODE DR 6-101(A)(3).
29. See infra Part IV.B.
30. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6; MODEL CODE DR 4-101; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
6068(e) (1990).
31. See also MODEL RULES Preamble para. 7, which notes that "a lawyer can be sure that
preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest because people are more likely
to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their communica-
tions will be private."
32. MODEL RULES Rules 1.7-1.11; MODEL CODE Canon 5; CAL. RULES Rules 3-300, 3-
310.
33. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt. 1. In general, a lawyer has the authority to make tactical
and procedural decisions in the case because of her knowledge of the law. See, e.g., Blanton v.
Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645 (Cal. 1985); State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991).
Note, however, that if a lawyer and client disagree about tactical decisions in a criminal case, the
lawyer generally must follow the client's wishes. See, e.g., State v. Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d 375,
382 (N.C. 1996); Ali, 407 S.E.2d at 189. The client, on the other hand, determines what the
objectives of the representation are to be, whether or not to file a lawsuit in the first place, and
who the defendants will be. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2.
34. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Hanosh Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 749 P.2d 90 (N.M.
1988); Blanton, 696 P.2d 645 (noting client's authority to make decisions that affect client's
"substantive rights").
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duty to communicate the information necessary for the client to make
an informed decision.
35
This brief review outlines the broad parameters of the attorney-
client relationship that are central to the functioning of the adversarial
system. This review, however, is far from exhaustive. It has focused
on the lawyer's role as a client representative within our adversarial
legal system and is intended merely to help the reader appreciate the
illustrations that follow from A Civil Action.
Nevertheless, the reader should recognize that a lawyer does not
function only as a client's representative. A lawyer also functions as
an officer of the legal system and, thus, is expected to conform her
conduct to the law.36 The lawyer's responsibility as an officer of the
legal system can sometimes conflict with her role as client representa-
tive. As we will see, this conflict arises with some regularity in legal
practice and is illustrated in A Civil Action.37
III. DID THE LAWYER OVERSTEP HIS BOUNDS?
One incident that is collateral to the Woburn case and that raises
important ethical issues is the description of Schlictmann's first trial
and the events that lead up to the trial.3" The case involved the
drowning death of client Lowell Eaton's son in a gravel pit. The
insurance company made a settlement offer before trial and then
increased the offer just before the case went to the jury. Despite the
urging of the experienced trial judge to accept the offer, Schlictmann
insisted on hearing the jury's verdict.
The author probably included this incident to demonstrate
Schlictmann's tenacity, a trait that would play a large role in the
Woburn case,39 and his confidence that he and his clients would pre-
35. MODEL RULES Rule 1.4; CAL. RULES Rules 3-500, 3-510; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6068(m) (1990).
36. MODEL RULES Preamble para. 4. In its entirety, paragraph 4 provides:
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in profes-
sional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer
should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or
intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for
those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a
lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a
lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.
Id.
37. See infra Part V.
38. HARR, supra note 1, at 60-63.
39. For example, Reed, of Mulligan & Reed, said of Schlictmann: "The kid is like a bull-
dog," and "once he gets hold of something, he doesn't let go." HARR, supra note 1, at 66. These
later would become prophetic words. During the settlement discussions with Grace after Bea-
trice had been dismissed from case, Schlictmann appeared to be the last person on the plaintiffs'
[Vol. 23:283
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vail if he could only present his case to a jury.4" This relatively short
passage also raises two broad issues that will later resonate in the
Woburn case: (1) competence, or what cases can-or should-a lawyer
take and still be able to fulfill her duty to represent her client compe-
tently; and (2) communication, or how a lawyer should counsel the cli-
ent so the client can make the kind of decisions it is the client's right or
responsibility to make. Both of these issues are important to law stu-
dents, who will be practicing within a year or two of taking their Pro-
fessional Responsibility course. Many of these students will work in a
solo practice or a small firm and will be concerned about how, without
the guiding hand of a senior attorney, they can acquire the experience
and skill necessary to represent their clients competently.
The facts of the Eaton case are straightforward. Lowell Eaton's
son had drowned in a gravel pit owned by a construction company.
When Eaton approached Schlictmann to take the case several years
later, the boy's grandmother, the only witness to the accident, had
died, and the pit had been filled. Another lawyer had filed the suit
against the construction company, but the last time Eaton had called
him about the case, the lawyer told Eaton "to stop dwelling on the
death of his son," and that the case "was hopeless." 4
team to concede they probably could not win at trial and needed to settle the case. Id. at 439.
40. Id. at 219.
41. Id. at 60. Did the first lawyer neglect the case? It is not clear from the facts whether
the lawyer had done much, if any, work on the case. This is another offshoot to explore: how
cases sometimes get put on the back burner, and when the time arrives to go forward with them,
the evidence has been lost or misplaced, and the case has become "hopeless." If this is what
actually happened in the Eaton case, then the first lawyer violated his duty to act diligently and
promptly on his client's behalf. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.3; CAL. RULE Rule 3-110. While a
discussion of case management may be better placed in a Law Practice course, failure to properly
manage files is the subject of numerous disciplinary complaints. This fact warrants at least a
general discussion in an ethics course. See, e.g., Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline
Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation? 1974 U. ILL. LAW F. 193, 195-217 (1974)
(reporting that for the year ending April 30, 1970, the Bar of the City of New York reported that
524 out of 966 disciplinary complaints, 54.6%, which the intake screeners had labeled prima facie
allegations with the disciplinary agency's jurisdiction, involved neglect). Sometimes a lawyer
does not neglect a case merely because she has forgotten about it. Lawyers may know a case is in
their files but will ignore it, seemingly hoping it will go away. Perhaps this occurs because the
lawyer originally told the client she had a good case, but after review now realizes what she
should have known when she accepted the representation: she cannot win the case. Despite
Harr's writing that many cases in many firms "die quietly in the files," HARR, supra note 1, at
66, for a lawyer to ignore a case in this fashion is a disciplinable offense. See, e.g., In re Ander-
son, 788 P.2d 95 (Ariz. 1990) (holding that it was a "knowing and callous" lack of diligence for a
lawyer to file suit, "do some discovery," but then fail to file pretrial brief and ignore client's let-
ters requesting he try to get case back on the docket); In re McCausland, 605 N.E.2d 185 (Ind.
1993) (holding that lawyer's failure to advise client he had no claim, failure to act promptly, and
failure to return file upon client's request was a disciplinable offense).
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A. Competence
Many lawyers are told early in their careers that a cardinal rule of
a successful law practice is to never turn down new clients, regardless
of how busy the lawyer may be. After all, you can never tell when the
practice will be slow and you will need the business. When Eaton
came to his office, however, being too busy was not one of Schlict-
mann's concerns. Schlictmann had been a lawyer in solo practice for
less than two years, following a brief stint as a government lawyer.
We are told he "eked out a living," and had fallen behind on his law
library payments.42 Despite the first lawyer's appraisal that the Eaton
case was "hopeless," the case and its potential for recovery was proba-
bly attractive to the cash-strapped Schlictmann.43
All the same, however, Schlictmann was relatively inexperienced.
Although the book refers to his handling a few workers' compensation
cases and a "slip 'n fall," he had never taken a case to trial before."
The question, then, is: what kinds of cases can--or should-a rela-
tively inexperienced lawyer accept? More specifically, should Schlict-
mann have taken the Eaton case? In essence, this situation poses a
conundrum: if a lawyer should not take certain kinds of cases unless
she has experience in those kinds of cases, how can the lawyer ever
obtain the necessary experience to take the case? This problem is
particularly relevant for a newly-licensed sole practitioner.
Both the Model Rules and the California Rules address this
conundrum by stating plainly that a lawyer is presumed to have cer-
tain legal skills, such as case analysis, evaluation of evidence, legal
writing, and the ability to identify what legal issues are involved in the
client's case.4" With these skills as a foundation, the lawyer can pro-
vide adequate legal representation "through necessary study"46 or "by
42. HARR, supra note 1, at 60.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 59-60. It is possible that Schlictmann had more experience than we can infer
from descriptions in the book. For purposes of generating class discussion, however, the experi-
ences outlined in the book are sufficient.
45. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.1 cmt. 2; CAL. RULES Rule 3-110(b)(C).
46. MODEL RULES Rule 1.1 cmt. 2. Rule 1.1 provides:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representa-
tion requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.
Comment 2 to Model Rule 1.1 provides in full:
[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle
legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted law-
yer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal
skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting,
are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of
determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessar-
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acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is
required."47 In short, despite a lack of experience in a particular area
of law, a lawyer generally should be able to apply the research and
analytical skills she acquired in law school to unfamiliar substantive
areas of law well enough to represent the client adequately.48
Competent representation of a client in a trial, however, does not
rest solely on a lawyer's research and analytical abilities. Trial advo-
cacy is a skill in itself that improves with experience. It is not a skill
most lawyers can learn from reading books. A lawyer who goes to trial
on behalf of a client without any prior trial experience is probably not
acting competently. Where a lawyer is in a firm, she can usually gain
such experience as a second chair at trial. In the prosecutor's or public
defender's office, another lawyer from the office will often assist the
new lawyer in her first trial. How, then, can a relatively inexperienced
ily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate
representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent represen-
tation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established compe-
tence in the field in question.
47. CAL. RULES Rule 3-110(C), which provides in full:
If a member does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal service is
undertaken the member may nonetheless perform such services competently by (1)
associating with or where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer rea-
sonably believed to be competent, or (2) by acquiring sufficient learning and skill
before performance is required.
48. For example, David Boies, who recently represented the U.S. Department of Justice in
its antitrust trial against Microsoft, has established a reputation as a formidable trial lawyer
across a broad spectrum of law. In the mid-1980s, he represented CBS in a libel suit brought by
retired General William C. Westmoreland. Boies believes that he can learn about any substan-
tive area of law:
Like other great litigators, Boies takes considerable pride in his ability to litigate any-
thing: an antitrust case, a contested takeover, a libel action. Prior to the Westmore-
land case, for example, he had never handled a libel suit-which caused initial anxiety
among the defendants. Mary Boies, an attorney herself and then a CBS vice president
for corporate information, recalls her colleagues there saying, "'David's a really good
antitrust lawyer, but what does he know about the First Amendment?' And I'd say,
'Well, it's a very short amendment. He will learn it."'
As Boies sees it, "It's not that hard to learn an area of the law. I know how to
communicate, read cases, organize facts. That is what a lawsuit is all about."
Cary Reich, The Litigator: David Boies, The Wall Street Lawyer Everyone Wants, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 1986, section 6, at 19. There are exceptions to the broad sweep of this "rule," that is,
there are probably areas of the law in which a lawyer should not-and in some instances, may
not-venture without specific training or background. Drafting and filing patent applications is
an area of law for which a lawyer must be specially licensed by the Patent and Trademark Office.
A lawyer attempting to practice in this area without being appropriately licensed would be sub-
ject to discipline. Some areas of law are highly technical and complex and have special courts for
resolving disputes. In these areas, a lawyer should assess a prospective client's situation and his
experience very carefully before accepting the client's case. Bankruptcy and tax law are two such
areas. In situations where the lawyer determines she should not take the case by herself, she can
refer the matter to a qualified lawyer or associate. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.1 cmt. 2;
CAL. RULES Rule 3-110(C).
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sole practitioner such as Schlictmann gain the necessary experience?
One possibility is to associate with a more experienced trial lawyer for
your first trial. This, in fact, is what the ethical codes recommend.49
Whether by teaching himself the law or associating with a more
experienced lawyer, a lawyer need not reject a case merely because he
is inexperienced. Nevertheless, we still need to ask whether Schlict-
mann should have taken the Eaton case. He had little experience in
personal injury cases (a "slip 'n fall" and a few workers' compensation
cases)."0 He had never tried a case, and he had no experience prepar-
ing for trial."1 In fact, we are told he "began reading books on the
fundamentals of discovery and trial practice. '52 The first lawyer had
assessed the case as "hopeless. '5 3 Most experienced personal injury
lawyers-including Schlictmann's friend and partner, Conway-
probably would have accepted the insurance company's offer to settle
for $5,000 . Nevertheless, the fact that the insurance company
offered anything demonstrates that Schlictmann, despite his inexper-
ience, was able through self-education to put together a case that
convinced the insurance company that settling a "hopeless" case was
still in its best interest.
After his trial victory, it is easy to say that Schlictmann made the
right decision in taking the Eaton case. Would we reach the same
conclusion, however, without the benefit of hindsight? On the one
hand, we cannot overlook the fact that when Mr. Eaton walked
through his office door, Schlictmann's finances were in trouble. There
is always the danger that a lawyer will overestimate his abilities or the
value of a case when "baby needs a new pair of shoes."55 The eco-
49. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.1 cmt. 2; CAL. RULE Rule 3-110(C). At the law school
where I teach, many of our graduates open solo practices or join firms with just one or two other
lawyers after being admitted to the bar. Many of my former students have related the fear they
felt when preparing for and conducting their first trial. They have all stated that the single most
important factor in helping them prepare for and conduct the trial was their having taken a Trial
Practice course in law school. All of them, however, said they consulted with a more experienced
lawyer.
50. HARR, supra note 1, at 59.
51. Id. at 60.
52. Id. at 61.
53. Id. In later offering Schlictmarm $5,000 to settle, the insurance company's claims man-
ager appears to have seconded this assessment by noting "[e]verybody in the case is dead-the
owner of the construction company, the boy's grandmother, the boy. Without the grandmother,
you don't have a witness to the boy's death." Id.
54. This of course assumes Conway would have accepted the case in the first place. It is
likely he would not have done so. See HARR, supra note 1, at 126 (Conway would say, "You
measure your success by the cases you don't take.").
55. In my Professional Responsibility class, I emphasize that a lawyer's self-interest is often
implicated in a lawyer's practice. It can affect the lawyer's actions and the recommendations the
lawyer makes to a client, whether it be to take a case in the first instance or to recommend that
[Vol. 23:283
Legal Ethics
nomic realities of a law practice might cloud the lawyer's judgment
and persuade him to take a case, a decision he may later regret. Such
decisions may result in the case becoming a "dog" or "orphan," in
Conway's taxonomy, relegated to gathering dust in the files. 6
Evaluating cases is a skill. A new lawyer will probably take more
cases that eventually will be dismissed than a lawyer who has been
practicing for many years. Time devoted to cases that eventually will
be dismissed weighs heavily on a new lawyer's resources and makes
him function less efficiently-and competently. Although Conway's
saying that "[y]ou measure your success by the cases you don't take"57
may be an overstatement, it is not far off the mark; as a lawyer learns
to evaluate cases, she will become more efficient in her practice and
better able to serve her clients.
On the other hand, despite Schlictmann's relative inexperience in
tort law, he had been a general practice lawyer for nearly two years and
had spent another nine months working as a government lawyer. By
that point, he may have reached a "comfort level""8 regarding his abil-
ities and would probably have been in a good position to assess his
chances of successfully prosecuting the case. His tenacity, at any rate,
was never in question.
A young lawyer will make mistakes. She will explore legal paths
that will become dead ends, take depositions or seek discovery that
eventually will prove irrelevant to the case, and spend many more
hours on the case than is necessary. There is nothing wrong with
these actions, particularly in a case for which the lawyer is being paid
the client settle a case. In presenting a hypothetical situation in class, I usually like to remind the
student that "baby needs a new pair of shoes." In other words, I want the student to discuss how
she would resolve the ethical dilemma if she were in practice and facing the realities of having to
make a living. It is easy in law school to divorce oneself from such realities and simply spout an
answer that reflects the aspirational goals of the profession (for example, withdrawing from rep-
resenting a client is a favorite response when the ethics of the situation appear even marginally
askance). I prefer, however, that the student factor into the calculus of her reasoning the finan-
cial responsibilities each lawyer must face in her practice. This is not to say that I disparage the
aspirations of the ethical codes; if anything, I urge the students to strive to realize them. At a
minimum, however, I want them to realize they can fulfill their ethical obligations and still earn a
living.
56. Kevin Conway, Schlictmann's partner, distinguished "dogs," or frivolous cases, from
"orphans." "Orphans" might have some merit, but because of problems of proof of liability or
damages, or expense to prepare, these cases are passed from lawyer to lawyer, often without any
lawyer ever actually taking the case. HARR, supra note 1, at 126. In addition to "dogs" and
"orphans," there are also "gold mines," or especially promising cases. Id. at 66. Gold mines,
although promising at first, nevertheless may reveal a fatal flaw after investigation, at which
point the lawyer might let the case wither in the files. That is what the first lawyer apparently
allowed to happen in the Eaton case. Id.
57. Id. at 126.
58. See supra note 48.
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on a contingent, or outcome, basis. As the lawyer gains experience,
she will be better able to recognize such fruitless avenues and not pur-
sue them. Thus, she will be in a better position to represent clients
more efficiently. While learning these lessons, however, she will still
be able to represent her client adequately, just as Schlictmann ade-
quately represented his client Eaton.
The important point here is that each lawyer has to assess not
only her experience, but also her ability to learn the law and to teach
herself what she needs to know in order to adequately represent the
client. A lawyer who is more comfortable advising clients on business
transactions and has never felt comfortable in adversarial situations
probably should not have taken the Eaton case. Another lawyer, how-
ever, who, either during law school or in motion hearings, has come to
feel comfortable in court or court-like situations and has confidence in
her ability to teach herself the nuances of discovery and procedure,
probably could take the case. Nevertheless, such an inexperienced
lawyer-indeed, someone like Schlictmann-probably should associ-
ate with a more experienced lawyer.5 9
B. Communication
A second issue that Schlictmann's first trial raises is the lawyer's
obligation to communicate with his client. As already noted, commu-
nication between client and lawyer fosters the lawyer's duty of loyalty
and, thus, is necessary for effective representation. 60 Nevertheless, one
of the most common complaints that clients have about their lawyers
is that the lawyers ignore them and do not return their calls. In par-
ticular, clients complain that the lawyers fail to obtain the clients' con-
sent.6'
There are situations in A Civil Action directly related to the
Woburn case that raise issues concerning a lawyer's duty to communi-
cate. 62 The relatively straightforward facts of the Eaton case however,
59. See supra note 49. Schlictmann did, in fact, associate with a more experienced lawyer,
Roisman of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (TLPJ), in the Woburn case. HARR, supra note 1,
at 76-77. His decision to associate appears to have been guided not only by Roisman's superior
expertise, but also by his realization that he did not have sufficient resources to pursue this liti-
gation. Id. Thus, another lesson to be taken from both Eaton and Woburn is the importance of
the lawyer's assessment not only of whether he has the expertise, but also whether he has the
financial resources to pursue a case on the client's behalf in a contingency fee situation.
60. See supra Part II.D.2.
61. See, e.g., NATIONAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE DATA CENTER, CHARACTERISTICS OF
LEGAL MALPRACTICE (1989). The National Malpractice Data Center was created by the
American Bar Association to gather data to determine the extent of the malpractice problem.
The report covers data gathered during the period from 1981 to 1985.
62. Probably the most striking illustration regarding a lawyer's duty to communicate with
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provide a better introduction to the duty to communicate and its rami-
fications, even though the book is thin on details about the advice
Schlictmann actually gave the Eatons about the insurance company's
offer.63 The case provides a better example because the other facts-
such as Schlictmann's inexperience, the lack of percipient witnesses,
and Schlictmann's and the Eatons' relatively shaky financial situa-
tions--can generate a fruitful discussion on what information a lawyer
should include in her advice to a client where the client must make a
decision, such as deciding whether to accept a settlement offer.
1. Division of Authority Between Lawyer and Client
The Model Rules recognize that "[b]oth lawyer and client have
authority and responsibility in the objectives and means of represen-
tation."64 In general, a lawyer has the right to make tactical and pro-
cedural decisions in the case because of her knowledge of the law.6" In
contrast, the client should determine what the objectives of the repre-
sentation are, whether to file a lawsuit in the first place, and who will
be named as a party to the suit.66 In addition, the client must make all
decisions that affect the resolution of the case or otherwise affect the
client's substantive rights, such as the decision to settle the case or
plead guilty.67
As part of providing competent representation, lawyers have a
duty to communicate with their clients.68 Of particular concern is that
her client revolves around the settlement negotiations between Schlictmann and Grace. HARR,
supra note 1, at 405-48, 451-54. The lawyers had been involved in negotiations for a while when
Tom Kiley, Schlictmann's friend and another personal injury lawyer who had provided support
throughout the Woburn case, said, "We've got a problem, Jan. I think you're ethically bound to
tell the families about the offer." Id. at 415. At that point, with a serious offer on the table, it
was imperative Schlictmann speak with the families before he pursued further negotiations. See
infra notes Part III.B. 1-2.
63. See HARR, supra note 1, at 62 ("He told the Eatons about the offer. 'I think we'll win
the case,' he said, 'and I think we'll get more money from the jury."' Lowell Eaton told Schlict-
mann to do what he "thought best.").
64. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2, cmt. 1.
65. See, e.g., Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645 (Cal. 1985); State v. Debler, 856
S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1993); State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183 (N.C. 1991). Note, however, that if a law-
yer and client disagree about tactical decisions in a criminal case, the lawyer generally must fol-
low the client's wishes. See, e.g., Ali, 407 S.E.2d at 189.
66. Limitations exist, however, on the client's right to make these determinations. For
example, if the objective of the representation or the client's course of action is criminal or
fraudulent, or if it will cause the lawyer to violate her ethical duties, the lawyer may not assist the
client. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(d), (e), cmts. 6-7.
67. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Hanosh Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 749 P.2d 90 (N.M.
1988); Blanton, 696 P.2d 645 (holding that a client has authority to make decisions that affect
client's "substantive rights").
68. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4 (Communi-
cation); CAL. RULES Rule 3-500 (Communication), Rule 3-510 (Communication of Settlement
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a lawyer keep the client apprised of matters about which the client has
authority to decide.69 Moreover, even when the client has delegated
authority to the lawyer, the latter should keep the client informed of
the matter's status.70
It is sometimes difficult to draw a line between "tactical" deci-
sions and decisions that affect the client's substantive rights, particu-
larly in criminal cases. For example, whether to waive a jury trial or
testify in one's defense, although superficially "tactical" decisions,
have potentially grave consequences for the client's substantive rights.
Therefore, these decisions are decisions that are universally recognized
as the client's to make.7' In civil matters, lawyers are accorded more
deference in making tactical decisions, within certain limitations.
72
Thus, while a lawyer may not stipulate to facts that would foreclose an
essential defense, 73 the lawyer can make decisions as to which wit-
nesses to present or how to conduct cross-examination.74
2. The Duty to Communicate Settlement Offers
A lawyer is obligated to keep his client informed about the pro-
gress of the case and to explain the matter to the client so that the cli-
ent can make an informed decision about those matters for which the
client has responsibility. 75 As already noted, it is the client's decision
whether to settle a case, 76 and the lawyer must keep the client apprised
Offer); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(m). See also Calvert v. State Bar, 819 P.2d 424 (Cal.
1991) ("Adequate communication with clients is an integral part of the competent professional
performance as an attorney.")
69. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.4 cmt. 1.
70. Id.
71. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); see also, e.g., United States v. Teague, 953
F.2d 1525 (1 lth Cir. 1992) (holding that a decision to testify is the client's).
72. See Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 847 F.2d 1109, 1117 (4th Cir. 1988).
73. See, e.g., Linsk v. Linsk, 449 P.2d 760, 763 (Cal. 1969).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Nahhas v. Pacific
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 299 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
75. See supra Part III.B.1. On the issue of communication generally, see MODEL RULE
1.4, which provides:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
See also CAL. RULES Rule 3-500, which provides:
A member shall keep a client reasonably informed about significant developments
relating to the employment or representation, including promptly complying with rea-
sonable requests for information and copies of significant documents when necessary
to keep the client so informed.
76. See MODEL RULE Rule 1.2(a) (providing that a "lawyer shall abide by a client's deci-
sion whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter" and, in a criminal case, "the lawyer
shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
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of any good faith settlement offer.77 Indeed, California has a separate
rule that identifies the lawyer's duty to communicate settlement
offers.78
3. The Eaton Case-An Illustration in Communication
In the Eaton case, Schlictmann, who had expended $15,000 pre-
paring the case, rejected the insurance company's claim manager's
offer to settle for $5,000. 7" Before closing arguments on the last day of
trial, the judge urged the parties to settle and suggested the defense
lawyer offer $75,000 to settle the case.80 Schlictmann advised the
Eatons of this offer in the courthouse hallway. Although a court clerk
advised him to take the offer, noting that a jury had awarded only
$20,000 in a recent, arguably more compelling case," Schlictmann told
the Eatons: "I think we'll win the case and I think we'll get more
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify"). See also MODEL CODE EC 7-7,
7-8; Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 650-51 (Cal. 1985) (holding that although the
lawyer has implied authority concerning procedural matters, the client has ultimate authority
concerning decisions that affect the outcome of the case or the client's substantive rights).
77. MODEL RULES Rule 1.4 cmt. 1. See, e.g., In re Cardenas, 791 P.2d 1032 (Ariz. 1990)
(finding that attorney failed to inform client of settlement offer prior to rejection of offer and
failed to explain matters to client in a manner that would allow the client to make informed deci-
sions).
78. California Rule 3-510 provides in part:
(A) A member shall promptly communicate to the member's client:
(1) All terms and conditions of any offer made to the client in a criminal matter;
and
(2) All amounts, terms, and conditions of any written offer of settlement made to
the client in all other matters.
CAL RULES Rule 3-510. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, For-
mal Op. 70-326 (1970) (noting that lawyer should inform his client of all settlement offers made
by the opposing party).
79. HARR, supra note 1, at 61. We do not know whether Schlictmann ever communicated
this offer to the Eatons. If he did not, it could have been a violation of the Model Rules, which
require the lawyer to communicate good faith offers to the client. Assuming the offer was made
in good faith and not just an attempt to test the waters (compare Facher's "bouncing ball" offer
later in the book, HARR, supra note 1, at 229-31), did Schlictmann violate his duty to communi-
cate such offers? It is possible Mr. Eaton had already authorized Schlictmann to reject offers
below a certain amount. It is also possible that the claims manager, who laughed when Schlict-
mann told him how much he had spent to prepare the case, withdrew the offer when he said,
"Maybe I'll come and watch this. I want to see the kid who blew the Eaton case." Finally, under
California Rule 3-510, a lawyer need only communicate "written" settlement offers. Here, the
offer was made over the phone. Even in California, however, if the offer could have been
deemed a "significant development" within the meaning of California Rule 3-500, then Schlict-
mann would be required to communicate it even if the offer was not in writing. "Any oral offers
of settlement made to the client in a civil matter should also be communicated if they are 'signifi-
cant' for purposes of rule 3-500." CAL. RULES Rule 3-510 Discussion.
80. In a sidebar conference, the judge said, "I think seventy-five thousand dollars is fair."
HARR, supra note 1, at 62.
81. The case involved a drunk driver who "ran down a kid playing on his own lawn." Id.
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money from the jury. '8 2 Eaton then told Schlictmann to "do what he
thought best."83
Despite the author's inclusion of only a few details of what
Schlictmann and the Eatons discussed in deciding whether to accept
the settlement, we can infer or hypothesize different scenarios that will
generate an interesting classroom discussion. The remainder of this
part of the Article demonstrates the directions in which the discussion
could go.
Model Rule 1.4(b) requires that the lawyer "explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation. "84 Did Schlictmann's advice
comport with this rule? A lawyer generally must explain the ramifica-
tions of a settlement offer. For example, if an accident victim has sued
the insured client for damages in excess of the client's policy limits but
has offered to settle within the policy limits, the lawyer must explain
to the client that she risks personal exposure for any sums beyond
policy limits that a jury may eventually award. a5 Did Schlictmann
provide Eaton with the kind of information Eaton needed to make the
decision to tell Schlictmann to "do what [Schlictmann] thought best,"
in essence rejecting the settlement? If not, what should Schlictmann
have told the Eatons?
We are told only that Schlictmann told the Eatons he thought
they would win at trial and the jury would award more money than
the insurance company offered. 6 Schlictmann did not explain why he
thought the jury would award more money than the settlement offer,
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Model Rule 1.4, Comment 1 elaborates on the information a lawyer is expected to pro-
vide the client under the duty to communicate:
The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions
concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be
pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. For example, a lawyer
negotiating on behalf of a client should provide the client with facts relevant to the
matter, inform the client of communications from another party and take other rea-
sonable steps that permit the client to make a decision regarding a serious offer from
another party.
MODEL RULES Rule 1.4, cmt. 1.
85. See, e.g., Lysick v. Walcom, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (holding that an
attorney's failure to communicate information to client so as to allow client to make intelligent
decision regarding representation was a violation of professional standards of care); Levier v.
Koppenheffer, 879 P.2d 40 (Kan. 1994) (holding that insurer's failure to inform client of settle-
ment offer and value of plaintiffs injuries breached duties of good faith and communication);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255 (Miss. 1988) (holding that a lawyer
retained by insurance company to represent insured was obligated to advise insured that accident
victim, whose complaint sought damages in excess of lawsuit, had made a settlement offer that
came within policy limits).
86. HARR, supra note 1, at 62.
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nor did he explain what the court clerk had told him about the other
case. Moreover, the author tells us that "after nearly a year of work,
Schlictmann wanted to hear what the jury would say, '"87 suggesting
that Schlictmann might have been more interested in hearing his first
jury verdict than in doing what was best for his client."8
Should not Schlictmann have articulated why he thought his cli-
ents would do better before a jury? It is possible he did. Although the
book contains only one line illustrating his advice to the Eatons, it is
likely his advice was more substantial." For example, he may already
have gone over the law and the evidence he had developed to prove his
case. Moreover, before Schlictmann had presented the case to the
jury, the insurance company had offered only $5,000. The judge, an
experienced trial lawyer, was now suggesting $75,000 was a fair offer.9"
As to the case the court clerk described in urging Schlictmann to
accept the settlement, we are not told whether Schlictmann mentioned
it to the Eatons. Although that case may have appeared more compel-
ling, we do not know all the facts. There may have been other factors
at play in the previous case that warranted the jury's awarding only
$20,000 to the boy's parents. Schlictmann could have fairly made the
evaluation that the outcome of the previous case was not relevant to
the decision whether to accept the $75,000 settlement offer. Further,
merely wanting to hear "what the jury would say" does not by itself
condemn Schlictmann's actions. Schlictmann had spent a substantial
amount of time and money preparing the case91 and, although lawyers
87. Id.
88. The Eaton case was Schlictmann's first opportunity to argue a case before a jury and
get "trial experience." Should Schlictmann have told the Eatons that he was relatively inexperi-
enced? Should he have told them that he had never actually tried a case? Is this the kind of
information the Eatons would have needed to make an informed decision about the offer and to
better evaluate Schlictmann's opinion of their chances of prevailing before a jury? Indeed, we
might well ask whether Schlictmann should have mentioned his relative lack of experience during
the initial consultation with Eaton. It is possible he did and that informing Eaton had no effect
on Eaton's decision to retain Schlictmann. After all, the first lawyer had told Eaton that the case
was "hopeless" and, as noted above, most experienced personal injury lawyers probably would
not have taken on the case. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. Indeed, Eaton may
very well have been to other lawyers who had rejected his case. These are all questions worth
pursuing with students, many of whom will face similar situations as they attempt to build a
practice.
89. Recall that during the time Schlictmann was meeting with the Eatons, the defense
counsel, McCarthy, had to contact his client, the insurance company, and obtain authorization to
make the $75,000 offer. HARR, supra note 1, at 62. This probably would have taken longer than
a few minutes.
90. Id. In addition, by subsequently agreeing with the judge on the $75,000 figure, the
insurance company, through its experienced trial lawyer, demonstrated it was aware the jury
could return with a much larger figure.
91. Spending more money prosecuting a case than the defendant offers in settlement is not
a situation most experienced lawyers would encounter. An experienced lawyer becomes adept at
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can never be sure, juries so often being unpredictable, he probably had
confidence in the case he had put together, a confidence buttressed by
the insurance company's increased settlement offer. Communicating
his confidence to the Eatons would not be unethical. Thus, while a
quick reading of the Eaton case facts suggests Schlictmann violated his
duty to discuss the ramifications of rejecting the offer, further consid-
eration suggests he may have had good reason at that point to urge
them to hear from the jury.
After he returned to court and refused the offer, however, the
judge said, "I was a trial lawyer for a long time. I think you ought to
give this very serious thought."92 This was not a court clerk's opinion.
It was the opinion of a judge, an experienced trial lawyer, probably
offered because the judge knew from Schlictmann's performance dur-
ing the trial how inexperienced he was.93 Was Schlictmann obligated
to request a recess so he could tell his clients what the judge had said?
Again, it is difficult to say with certainty because we do not know pre-
cisely what Schlictmann told the Eatons during their later conference
in the hallway. It is likely Schlictmann was aware that the guaranteed
settlement of $75,000, not dependent on the fickleness of a jury, was a
good offer. He knew the Eatons were not well-to-do94 and could walk
away with nothing if the decision were left up to the jury. Should he
have told them what the judge had said after he returned to the court?
This is a difficult question. If, in the hallway conference,
Schlictmann had adequately disclosed the advantages and disadvan-
tages of proceeding to a jury verdict, then the Eatons' decision proba-
bly would not have been affected by the judge's further statements.
The Eatons already should have been aware that the judge favored
settlement, and any further information would not change their deci-
sion. Moreover, the Eatons had lost their son, had been stonewalled
by both the construction and insurance companies, and had even been
abandoned by their first lawyer. At this point, a money settlement,
where the defendant admits no wrongdoing, may not have been what
the Eatons wanted from their suit.9" It is possible that the parents
evaluating a case and estimating how much it will cost to bring to trial. If the lawyer determines
the probability of losing money on the case is great, she will not accept the case. See supra note
54.
92. HARR, supra note 1, at 62.
93. We are told the judge often "would summon Schlictmann to the bench and explain the
rudiments of trial technique." Id.
94. Consider the claims manager's statement that $5,000 was "more money than this fam-
ily has ever seen before." Id. at 61.
95. Money is not what plaintiffs always want to get from a lawsuit. Compare the Grace
settlement, where the judge would vacate the verdict and order a new trial. Id. at 451. This did
not sit well with some of the families who repeatedly had stated they were not suing for the
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wanted vindication in court as much or more than they wanted
money. They wanted to hear from a jury that the company, and not
they or the child's deceased grandmother, was responsible for their
son's death. Under those circumstances, the Eatons might have been
willing to risk the chance of getting no recovery.
If that were true and Schlictmann had already discussed the pos-
sibility of no recovery with the Eatons, then he probably was within
ethical bounds by not seeking further consultation with the Eatons
after the judge's comment. Given the facts we have, however, espe-
cially the judge's strong language when Schlictmann returned to court,
he probably should have requested a recess and mentioned the judge's
S1 96opinion.
There are other situations in A Civil Action where the lawyer's
duty to communicate arises, most often in the relation to communi-
cating settlement offers and their ramifications to clients. These
include the Grace negotiations toward the end of the book97 and the
O'Connell case.9" These situations also raise other interesting issues,
such as the rules that prohibit a lawyer from participating in an aggre-
gate settlement by all the lawyer's clients unless all the clients agree,
99
and whether the lawyer must disclose to a client his interest in settling
a case where he intends to use his fee to fund another lawsuit.' ° They
are both topics worth pursuing in class.
money but rather to obtain an apology from the companies that had caused the pollution that
killed their children. See id. at 442.
96. The author may give us some insight into what actually transpired when he writes,
"Schlictmann's gamble had paid off, but it had been foolhardy, dignified only by his inexperi-
ence and the fact that he'd won. It was not necessarily the best sort of lesson for a fledgling law-
yer." Id. at 63. This suggests that Schlictmann's recommendation to go to the jury was wrong,
and it was only because he was inexperienced that he had even suggested it. Any experienced
lawyer would probably readily have taken the $75,000, avoiding the dangers of an unpredictable
jury.
97. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
98. HARR, supra note 1, at 322-23, 341-42. See also infra note 100.
99. "A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggre-
gate settlement of the claims of or against the clients,... unless each client consents after con-
sultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of [all the claims involved] and of the
participation of each person in the settlement." MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(g). See also CAL.
RULES Rule 3-310(D). This situation arose during the Grace negotiations. Some of the families
would likely be dropped from the suit in light of the jury's responses to the special verdict, and,
therefore, might be more interested in settling their claims than the other families who could
remain in the suit. HARR, supra note 1, at 441-43. Schlictmann recognized this and understood
his ethical obligations that all the families agree to the settlement or there would be none. Id. at
442.
100. Compare the ethical considerations involved in the Unifirst settlement with the
O'Connell settlement. Id. at 322-23; 341-42. In the former case, where the settlement proceeds
were earmarked to fund the very same suit from which the settlement was obtained, there were
no conflict of interest concerns. In the O'Connell case, however, there was pressure on the law-
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IV. DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND LOYALTY
One of the more intriguing scenes in A Civil Action, a scene that
sets the tone for the interaction between and among the various parties
and lawyers throughout the lawsuit, is the Rule 11 motion Cheeseman
filed early in the suit. In his motion, Cheeseman accused Schlictmann
not only of filing a lawsuit before Schlictmann had sufficient facts to
support his legal claims, but also of the rarely invoked claim of barra-
try, which is the groundless stirring up of lawsuits."'
yers to settle the suit of one plaintiff, O'Connell, so they would have sufficient resources to fund
the Woburn suit. This was a potential conflict of interest that was never realized. From the
description of the O'Connell negotiations, Schlictmann et al. comported themselves in an ethical
manner. Id. at 324 (after being told the insurance company had offered only $175,000, Phillips
said, "we'll have to put the case on the trial calendar for next fall and hope you're finished with
Woburn by then. We can't sell out. We've got to settle for fair value or we won't settle.").
101. Id. at 100-19. Barratry is related to champerty, the unlawful maintenance of a lawsuit,
that is, "where a person without an interest in it agrees to finance the suit, in whole or in part, in
consideration for receiving a portion of the proceeds of the litigation." Saladini v. Righellis, 687
N.E.2d 1224, 1225 (Mass. 1997). Barratry is probably better understood as a lawyer "soliciting"
business by either personally or through an agent approaching clients for their legal business.
Generally, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting business in-person (including live telephone
calls) from prospective clients, the notorious "ambulance chasing." See MODEL RULES Rule
7.3; MODEL CODE DR 2-104(A). As already discussed, supra notes 30-40 and accompanying
text, it is believed the legal system functions best if both parties are represented by competent
counsel. A person's choice of lawyer is a very important decision. Because it is feared that a
lawyer, someone skilled in the persuasive arts, would be able to unduly influence a prospective
client's choice, the ethical codes consistently have prohibited solicitation. MODEL RULES Rule
7.3, MODEL CODE DR 2-104. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993). The bar on solicita-
tion in both the Model Rules and the Model Code applies regardless of whether or not the suit
for which the lawyer solicits the plaintiff is groundless or not. Although barratry also involves
solicitation of clients-the lawyer cannot "stir up" a suit without a client it goes further in that
the lawyer solicits clients so that he can file a meritless or "groundless" suit. Presumably, the
lawyer who engages in barratry anticipates he will be able to force a settlement of some of the
suits regardless of their merit. Finally, it should be noted that solicitation of prospective clients
where pecuniary gain is not the primary motive for solicitation is not barred. MODEL RULES
Rule 7.3; In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
Other situations arise in the book where a teacher could discuss a lawyer's solicitation of pro-
spective clients. Neither a lawyer, nor an agent for a lawyer, may solicit business from a pro-
spective client. Consider, for example, when the Woburn lawyer who handled her divorce,
called Donna Robbins, said he had been following events in the newspaper, and suggested a law-
suit against the city. HARR, supra note 1, at 45. He then suggested Mulligan as a good candidate
to be her lawyer. Id. We do not know whether the lawyer had an agreement with Mulligan, but
we do know that he previously had referred Donna Robbins to Mulligan. Given that both Reed
and Mulligan were proponents of "referral fees," id. at 64, 455, we might infer that he and the
Wobum lawyer had a quid pro quo relationship. If true, the lawyer's contacting Donna Robbins
was a violation, as would any referral fee Mulligan would pay the lawyer. See infra Part IV.B.
As a counterpoint to this situation, a professor could also refer to the incident where Schlict-
mann was retained by the ex-husband of one of the victims of the Piper Arrow case. See HARR,
supra note 1, at 64. There, the ex-husband met Schlictmann's secretary in a bar, he told her he
was looking for a lawyer, and she referred him to Schlictmann. This was not a case, however,
where the secretary sought out the husband. Had she done so, Schlictmann would have been
liable for improper solicitation of legal business because his secretary is deemed his agent. Of
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Barratry itself is of no particular interest. Indeed, since the
events of A Civil Action, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
ruled that barratry would no longer be recognized in that state.1"2 The
Rule 11 motion and ensuing hearing, however, provide an excellent
introduction for students to several ethics issues: the attorney-client
privilege (the "privilege") and how it differs from the lawyer's duty
not to disclose her client's confidential information (the "duty of con-
fidentiality");"°3 a lawyer's duty not to file frivolous lawsuits;"' and alawyer's duty of loyalty to his or her client.
A. The Facts Underlying the Barratry Allegations
The facts that gave rise to Cheeseman's Rule 11 motion alleging
barratry involved Roland Gamache, an adult Woburn resident who
was diagnosed with leukemia.0 5 Schlictmann's discussion of strategy
with the potential plaintiffs at the Trinity Episcopalian Church pre-
ceded Gamache's diagnosis, and so Gamache did not become involved
in the lawsuit until April 1982, about a month before Schlictmann
filed the complaint. One of the other plaintiffs, Gamache's neighbor
Joan Zona, had asked Gamache if he wanted to join the suit against
the polluters. He decided to join and met with Schlictmann in Boston.
Although Gamache and his wife spent an entire day with Schlictmann"answering questions about themselves," Schlictmann apparently
never identified precisely who the defendants were.0 6
course, given the supposition involved in both these scenarios, a reader could well decide they are
mere stirrings up of groundless ethical discussions.
102. Saladini, 687 N.E.2d at 1224.
103. The attorney-client privilege and duty not to disclose client information are two
separate but related concepts central to the practice of law that many practicing lawyers never-
theless confuse.
104. Federal Rule 11, which was amended in 1993, generally prohibits a lawyer from filing
suits that are not supported by the facts or law, or which are filed for an improper purpose such
as harassing the opponent or increasing the cost of litigation. See FED R. Civ. P. 11. Model
Rule 3.1 prohibits a lawyer from bringing or defending a proceeding, or asserting or controvert-
ing an issue in the suit unless there is a nonfrivolous basis for doing so, essentially tracks Rule
11's prohibitions. Bar discipline for violations of Model Rule 3.1, however, is imposed only in
the rarest cases. Thus, Rule 11 probably provides the most important practical sanction if a law-
yer fails to verify the facts or law upon which she relies: Rule 11 awards attorney's fees to the
party that prevails on the motion. Despite Rule 1 l's practical importance to regulating lawyer
conduct in the litigation contest, a detailed discussion of its intricacies is beyond the scope of this
introduction to using A Civil Action to supplement a legal ethics course. I will discuss Model
Rule 3.1 only briefly in relation to Cheeseman's assertion of the attorney-client privilege. See
infra Part IV.C.
105. HARR, supra note 1, at 101-03.
106. It is likely Schlictmann would have mentioned that they were suing Grace and Bea-
trice, but he may not have mentioned that the tannery owned by Beatrice was part of the lawsuit.
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Several months later, Gamache asked Riley, the tannery's presi-
dent and a defendant in the case, for a favor. Riley was aware
Gamache was a plaintiff and angrily questioned him. Gamache
admitted he was unaware Riley was a defendant and stated, "I didn't
realize your tannery was part of the lawsuit. The lawyers were looking
for people to join the case. All we want to do is stop the big chemical
companies from dumping.""1 7 Riley then called Neil Jacobs, one of
Facher's partners, and told him that Gamache was unaware that Riley
was a defendant, and added that "[h]e said he did it because the law-
yer got him into it."1 8
Although Beatrice, the tannery's parent corporation, had decided
not to join Cheeseman's Rule 11 motion, Jacobs called Cheeseman
and described Riley's meeting with Gamache. °9 Based on this infor-
mation, Cheeseman included the barratry allegation in his Rule 11
motion. Cheeseman stated in support of the allegation that "[wie have
highly specific and direct evidence to support this charge, but at this
time, it is based on privileged communication from counsel for W.R.
Grace's codefendant."1 The rationale for Cheeseman's assertion of
privilege was that Riley's comments, which were the basis for the alle-
gation, had been communicated to his lawyer Jacobs... and, thus, were
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Due to the alleged privi-
leged nature of the communication, Cheeseman did not reveal the
substance of Riley's allegations either in the motion or during the Rule
11 hearing. 2
B. The Attorney- Client Privilege and the Duty Not to Disclose the
Client's Confidential Information
It is important to distinguish between the attorney-client privi-
lege on the one hand and the lawyer's duty not to disclose his or her
client's confidential information on the other. The attorney-client
privilege is a narrow evidentiary privilege that allows a client to pre-
107. Id. at 103.
108. Id. at 104.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 105.
111. See infra Part IV.B.1.
112. It is important to understand that Schlictmann was completely in the dark about what
the "highly specific and direct evidence" could be. He had no idea, in fact, that the "evidence"
had been obtained from one of his clients. This was not a case where he could simply interview
all his clients to see what they might have said among themselves or to other persons, and which
then could have gotten back to other side. In addition to being in the dark, if the judge found
him liable for barratry, the judge would have reported him to the state bar. Not knowing what
evidence would be presented against him left Schlictmann understandably upset before the
motion hearing. HARR, supra note 1, at 108-09.
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vent a witness from revealing confidential communications between cli-
ent and lawyer (or either's agents).' 13  It applies whenever the
authority of the state, through its subpoena or contempt power, is
invoked to compel the giving of information. 1
4
The legal system is adversarial, and a lawyer cannot adequately
represent his client unless he knows the client's side of the story. The
policy underlying the privilege is to encourage candor between the cli-
ent and lawyer."' Without the assurance of the attorney-client privi-
lege, it is believed the client would not reveal the information
necessary to enable effective representation.16 However, when the
client is assured the lawyer cannot be compelled to disclose communi-
cations between lawyer and client, the client will disclose the facts the
lawyer needs for competent representation." 7 This in turn "pro-
mote[s] the broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice." ''"
The lawyer's ethical duty to preserve a client's confidences and
secrets, on the other hand, is broader. It applies in every other situa-
113. The attorney-client privilege is governed by statute in most states. See, e.g., CAL.
EVID. CODE § 952. Nevertheless, the statutes appear to be for the most part codifications of the
common law rule. See, e.g., Spectrum Systems Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055,
1059-60 (N.Y. 1991) (describing attorney-client privilege as "a mere reenactment of the com-
mon-law rule"). See also J.F. Rydstrom, Annot., Applicability of Attorney-Client Privilege to
Communications with Respect to Contemplated Tortious Acts, 2 A.L.R. 3d 861 § 1 n.4 (1965).
No federal statute or rule sets out a federal attorney-client privilege. Instead, the Federal Rules
of Evidence provide a more general framework for deciding evidentiary questions based on a
claim of privilege:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501. See also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998); Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
114. To invoke the privilege, it is not necessary to actually be present in a proceeding in a
court or other government tribunal, nor is it necessary that a state official be attempting to com-
pel the disclosure of information. Depositions and other discovery requests propounded by
nongovernment, private lawyers also implicate the privilege because lawyers conduct discovery
under the general authority of the courts and, thus, state authority. A lawyer compels compli-
ance with a discovery request by invoking the state's authority and filing a motion in court to
compel the other party's compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.
115. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. 399 (citing Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389).
116. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403; Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12,
(1996). See also MODEL RULES Preamble para. 7, Rule 1.6 cmts. 2 & 4.
117. See infra notes 135-39.
118. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389.
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tion not covered by the privilege, that is, the duty exists regardless of
whether someone invoking the state's power is trying to compel the
lawyer to disclose information and regardless of whether the lawyer
learned of the information from the client or a third person. Put
another way, it is the lawyer's duty not to "gossip" about his
client' -to not voluntarily disclose information about the client that
is not public knowledge.
121
Schlictmann asked the court to order Cheeseman to disclose the
"evidence" upon which he based his motion, but Cheeseman
demurred. Because Cheeseman's refusal to disclose the information
before a tribunal implicated the attorney-client privilege, it is dis-
cussed first. The lawyer's ethical duty not to disclose confidential
client information is discussed after the privilege.
1. The Attorney-Client Privilege
Because the attorney-client privilege is a privilege that prevents
the trier of fact from obtaining evidence that would assist in discover-
ing the truth, it generally is narrowly construed. That is, the privilege
is not applicable unless specific requirements are satisfied. Wigmore
set out the rule governing the privilege's application:
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a profes-
sional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communica-
tions relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from dis-
closure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protec-
tion be waived. 22
119. Referring to the duty as a "duty not to gossip" is not intended to belittle the lawyer's
duty to preserve client confidential information, but rather to impress upon the reader the broad
reach of the duty. It is a duty that is of paramount importance to preserving the lawyer-client
relationship. The codification of California's duty in section 6068(e) of the California Business
and Professional Code neatly communicates that the duty is akin to sacred:
It is the duty of an attorney... :
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to
preserve the secrets of his or her client.
The Model Rules, while perhaps not so emphatic as the California statute, nevertheless state that
a "lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client con-
sents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b)." MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(a).
120. Indeed, some authorities argue that the proscription on discussing client confidential
information applies even when the information has subsequently become public. See, e.g.,
WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at § 6.7.4. See also State Bar of Cal. Comm. on Professional Respon-
sibility and Conduct CAL 1986-87 (1986) (holding that a lawyer may not reveal client's criminal
record to court, even though criminal record is public).
121. See infra Part IV.B.2.
122. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (footnote omitted).
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Under this characterization, Riley's communication to Jacobs'23
was privileged. Riley was discussing the lawsuit with Jacobs when he
told Jacobs about his meeting with Gamache; thus, Riley was seeking
legal advice'24 from Jacobs, a "legal adviser," acting in his capacity as
Riley's lawyer. 2 Riley and Jacobs were talking over the phone, so the
conversation was made in confidence.'26 Therefore, the client Riley
can prevent the lawyer's disclosure of the legal consultation's details or
refuse to disclose what he said to Jacobs, even in the face of testimonial
compulsion. The client, Riley, can waive the privilege and allow his
lawyer to testify or even disclose the details of the legal consultation
himself. That, however, did not happen. Instead, Cheeseman, coun-
sel for Beatrice's codefendant Grace, claimed the privilege when Judge
Skinner questioned him.'27
The foregoing paragraph raises several questions. The answers
to these questions can elucidate the privilege's parameters for a stu-
dent: (1) How can a lawyer claim the attorney-client privilege pre-
vents him from disclosing information when the information is from a
The Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers, reduces the number of elements,
stating the rule as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this Restatement, the attorney-client privilege may be
invoked as provided in § 135 with respect to:
(1) a communication
(2) made between privileged persons
(3) in confidence
(4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1 1996)
123. HARR, supra note 1, at 92-93.
124. Even if one were to argue that Riley's comments on Gamache were not directly related
to the lawsuit, a questionable argument at best, the comments are still privileged. Where the
client has sought legal advice from a lawyer, the fact that some of what was said is nonlegal and
incidental to the representation does not result in loss of the privilege. United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
125. Two points need to be made here. First, it is critical that the lawyer was consulted in
her capacity as a legal adviser and not as a business adviser or a friend. See, e.g., People v.
Gionis, 892 P.2d 1199 (Cal. 1995) (holding that attorney client privilege is not applicable to con-
versation between criminal defendant and a lawyer where lawyer told the defendant he would not
represent either the defendant or his wife, who had just served him with divorce papers, and
where the defendant nevertheless proceeded to discuss the case with the lawyer). Second, I have
referred to Jacobs as Riley's lawyer for simplicity of discussion. Jacobs and Facher represented
Beatrice, the parent corporation of the tannery. Strictly speaking then, Jacobs was not Riley's
lawyer. In fact, we know that Riley had retained a personal lawyer, Mary Ryan, in the matter.
HARR, supra note 1, at 462-64. Nevertheless, by virtue of the tannery's being a subsidiary of
Beatrice, and Riley's and Beatrice's interests being the same, Riley's communications would have
been privileged. See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
126. Under the Federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22
(1994 & Supp. 1998), a privilege for otherwise privileged material is not waived solely because it
was transmitted electronically and then intercepted. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4).
127. HARR, supra note 1, at 112-13.
Seattle University Law Review
conversation between opposing parties to a lawsuit, plaintiff Gamache
and defendant Riley? (2) Assuming a privilege attaches to the Jacobs-
Riley consultation, why could Facher have not simply given his con-
sent to Cheeseman's disclosing the Gamache-Riley conversation? In
other words, if the tannery is the client, who can waive the privilege:
the tannery, the tannery's lawyers, or Riley? (3) How can Cheeseman
claim the privilege; was the privilege not waived and lost when Jacobs,
counsel for Beatrice, told Cheeseman, counsel for Grace, about his
conversation with Riley? (4) By disclosing his conversation with
Gamache to Jacobs, did Riley bring that conversation within the
privilege so that he (Riley) would not have to testify about the under-
lying facts (the Gamache-Riley conversation)?
First, we need to identify precisely what the privileged commu-
nication was. The defendants in this case were not claiming that the
conversation between Gamache and Riley was privileged; after all,
neither was a lawyer. Nor could a party to a lawsuit expect that a con-
versation with an opponent was confidential. Rather, the claimed
privileged communications were made during the legal consultation
between Riley and his lawyer, Jacobs, the subject of which was the
lawsuit.'28 As already discussed, that consultation is privileged.' 29
The next question asks who the client is for purposes of waiving
the privilege. The defendant in the lawsuit was Riley's tannery, but
Riley himself relayed the details of the Gamache conversation to
Jacobs. Who then is empowered to make the decision to invoke or
waive the privilege?
Although a corporation does not have the same Fifth Amend-
ment right not to incriminate itself that an individual has, 3 ° it is
accorded the attorney-client privilege concerning communications
between its human constituents and its lawyers.' A corporation can
create, assert, and waive the privilege only through the acts of its
employees and officers.'32 Moreover, it is not just the communications
of the corporation's controlling management group that are protected.
Communications of low-level employees can also be protected. 33
128. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
130. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 380 (1960).
131. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
132. Id. at 390-91.
133. In concluding that the communications from low-level Upjohn employees to the cor-
poration's employees were privileged, the Supreme Court explained:
The communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to counsel for Upjohn
acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice
from counsel .... Information, not available from upper-echelon management, was
needed to supply a basis for legal advice concerning compliance with securities and
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Here, Riley, the president of the tannery, a member of the con-
trol group (indeed, probably the control group by himself), communi-
cated information concerning the lawsuit to Jacobs. Because only the
corporation, here the tannery, can waive the privilege,134 its lawyers
(Facher and Jacobs) could not reveal the substance of Jacobs' consul-
tation with Riley without the tannery's permission. The tannery's
permission could be communicated only through one of its human
constituents, Riley. Therefore, Facher had to leave the courtroom
when Judge Skinner asked him. Facher had to call Riley, the de facto
holder of the privilege Cheeseman asserted, and obtain a waiver from
Riley to reveal the Gamache conversation on which the barratry alle-
gations were based.'35
The third issue asks why the privilege was not waived when
Jacobs told Cheeseman about his conversation with Riley. If the con-
versation was between Riley and his lawyer, how could Cheeseman
claim the privilege? Neither Riley nor the tannery were clients of
Cheeseman, and the privilege generally will be deemed waived if
revealed to a third person.'36 Cheeseman's and Facher's clients, how-
ever, were engaged in a "joint defense." Courts have generally applied
a "joint defense" or "pooled information" doctrine, holding that
tax laws, foreign laws, currency regulations, duties to shareholders, and potential liti-
gation in each of these areas. The communications concerned matters within the
scope of the employees' corporate duties, and the employees themselves were suffi-
ciently aware that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could
obtain legal advice.... Consistent with the underlying purposes of the attorney-
client privilege, these communications must be protected against compelled disclo-
sure.
Id. at 394-95 (footnotes omitted). The rationale for protecting communications of low-level
employees is that the legal system functions best when the lawyer, in this case the lawyer for the
corporation, knows the facts. Id. at 391-92. It is often the lower-level employees who are famil-
iar with the facts. If there were no privilege for their communications, then a lawyer would have
no incentive to question them, which would undermine the central rationale for allowing the
privilege in the first place.
134. See, e.g., Innes v. Howell Corp., 76 F.3d 702, 712 (6th Cir. 1995); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 570 F.2d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 1978).
135. Note that we are only discussing the lawyers' authority to disclose what Riley and
Jacobs discussed in their conversation. Just because Riley has communicated the facts of his
conversation with Gamache, however, does not make that conversation privileged. See infra
notes 142-46 and accompanying text. Finally, Facher probably did not leave the courtroom to
call Riley to obtain his permission to reveal the contents of the Riley-Gamache conversation. It
is more likely that the tannery's parent, Beatrice, which ultimately would pay for any recovery
against the tannery, was "calling the shots" in the litigation. Facher probably left to contact the
persons at Beatrice's headquarters who were overseeing the litigation.
136. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Cooper, 90 F.R.D. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). More-
over, some authorities have held that if a communication could have been overheard, even if the
lawyer and client did not intend it to be, the privilege can be lost. See, e.g., New York State Bar
Association Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 641 (1993) (holding that lawyers must take care
when disposing of papers that contain client confidences).
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communications between and among co-parties and their counsel in
civil and criminal actions are privileged.137 Thus, Jacobs telling
Cheeseman about his conversation with Riley would not have waived
the privilege.
However, such communications come within the privilege only
so long as a "community of interest" between or among the parties
exists or the parties communicated with each other to advance a com-
mon interest. 13' Facher had declined to join in Cheeseman's Rule 11
motion.'39 Moreover, only after Facher had made this decision did
Jacobs tell Cheeseman about his conversation with Jacobs. Could the
privilege, which only attaches where co-parties have a common inter-
est, have survived Jacobs' conversation with Riley? Because the
information had been communicated so that one of the "joint parties"
could develop its own strategy, it arguably was not within the "pooled
information" exception. Nevertheless, despite the apparent "schism"
between the Woburn defendants on early strategy, Grace's prevailing
on the Rule 11 motion would also accrue to the benefit of Beatrice and
the tannery. Thus, the community of interest remained intact and the
privilege could be asserted.
Two issues remain regarding the attorney-client privilege that
the barratry allegations raise. Although Cheeseman and Grace proba-
bly could assert the privilege with respect to the Jacobs-Riley conver-
sation, most students will probably be troubled by one lawyer
asserting a privilege to avoid disclosing the basis for a motion that
raises questions about another lawyer's professional reputation. Two
things are troubling here. First, most readers probably cannot help
but feel that the Gamache-Riley conversation cannot be privileged,
40
that is, Riley's merely relating what transpired to Jacobs should not be
able to insulate Riley's conversation with Gamache from disclosure.
137. The doctrine can apply to both plaintiffs and defendants. It is recognized for certain
communications between parties who share a common interest in a lawsuit but are represented
by different lawyers. See WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at § 6.4.9 (pooled information doctrine).
See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 152 F.R.D. 132, 140 (N.D. 1993);
United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).
138. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at § 6.4.9. Consequently, if there is a falling out among the
parties, there would be no further protection for confidential information revealed in joint con-
versations. This may have been one of the reasons why Facher was upset with Cheeseman for
impleading Unifirst into the lawsuit. Aside from the fact that Unifirst was peripherally involved
and would want to settle the suit-thus replenishing the plaintiffs war chest-there was no
incentive for Unifirst to cooperate with either Beatrice or Grace. Thus, neither Facher nor
Cheeseman could expect any of their communications with Unifirst would be privileged.
139. In describing Facher's decision, the author relates one of the more memorable lines in
the book: "'I'm a great believer in doing things once,' Facher liked to say. 'If you're going to
knock a guy down, do it so he can't get up again."' HARR, supra note 1, at 104.
140. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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Second, assuming the students' impression about the nonprivileged
nature of the Gamache-Riley conversation is accurate, most students
will view Grace's assertion of a technical privilege as gratuitous
gamesmanship, unfair not only to Schlictmann, but also to the legal
system. Should not Cheeseman have simply obtained the tannery's
waiver before he filed his motion? This second question is addressed
in the section outlining the duty to not file frivolous law suits."'
With respect to the former point, the readers' gut feeling is cor-
rect: Riley's telling Jacobs about the Gamache conversation does not
make that conversation privileged. Were Riley called to the stand and
placed under oath, Riley would have to testify truthfully about what
happened when Gamache came to ask a favor.142 In other words, the
privilege does not protect the underlying facts that are discussed dur-
ing the attorney-client conference."' It does, however, protect the
communication between lawyer and client.144 What this means in the
context of the barratry allegations is that lawyer Jacobs-and, for that
matter, Facher and Cheeseman as well 4 -- cannot be called to testify
at all. Their knowledge of the Gamache-Riley conversation comes
only from the privileged conversation Jacobs had with Riley. More-
over, even though Riley would have to disclose what he and Gamache
said to one another, that is, testify about the underlying facts disclosed
during the privileged conference with his lawyer, he would not have to
testify about what he told Jacobs or Jacobs said to him. Again, that
consultation is privileged.'46
141. See infra Part IV.C.
142. Realistically, Schlictmann would not even call Riley if he had even known the evi-
dence upon which Cheeseman was basing the barratry allegations was a conversation one of the
defendants had had with one of Schlictmann's clients. All Schlictmann would have to do is
question his clients about whether they had met with any of the defendants. Of course, it is pos-
sible Gamache would have been embarrassed by the problems he had caused and reticent about
his participation, but most likely Schlictmann would have been able to extract the information so
that he could then counter the barratry charges. Nevertheless, for purposes of discussion, we will
assume that Riley is called to the stand.
143. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981).
144. Id. at 395. The privilege protects not only the client's communications to the lawyer,
but also legal advice the lawyer gives to the client. See, e.g., Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc.,
129 F.3d 1355, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997); In re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 602-03
(N.D. Tex. 1981); CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 ("'confidential communication between client and
lawyer' means information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of
that relationship ... and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in
the course of that relationship.").
145. As discussed supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text, Cheeseman need not testify
because of the "pooled information" doctrine.
146. See supra text accompanying note 144. This is an important distinction. It means
that a client cannot insulate facts or documents-underlying facts-from discovery simply by
disclosing them or giving them to his lawyer. The client still has to testify about those under-
lying facts and the lawyer would have to produce the documents during discovery. The tobacco
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2. Lawyer's Duty to Preserve Client's Confidences
Because the barratry allegations and conference involved the
attorney-client privilege, little has been said about the broader duty to
preserve clients' confidential information, the aforementioned "duty
not to gossip."' The Rule 11 conference nevertheless provides a
meaningful counterpoint to one of the most important duties a lawyer
owes her client.148 Unless a client is relatively certain that his lawyer
will neither disclose embarrassing information about him, nor use his
confidential information either to the client's advantage or the lawyer's
advantage, the client cannot trust the lawyer and their relationship will
fail. 149 Moreover, the lawyer's duty of confidentiality is central to
other issues that arise in legal ethics, including conflicts of interest 50
and client perjury."
As is evident from the previous discussion on the barratry
motion, the attorney-client privilege acts as a shield with a narrow
companies litigation has unfortunately revealed that the companies in fact were able to insulate
otherwise discoverable documents such as unfavorable research reports by delivering them to
their lawyers and then claiming they were privileged. See, e.g., Ronald L. Motley & Tucker S.
Player, Issues in "Crime-Fraud" Practice and Procedure: The Tobacco Litigation Experience, 49
S.C. L. REV. 187 (1998). The conduct of the lawyers in tobacco litigation during much of the
century is viewed as one of the great legal ethical embarrassments of the profession. See, e.g., id.;
Richard A. Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, Ethics in Ashes: Big Tobacco's Lawyers Hide Behind the
Cloak of Privilege, 18 CAL. LAW 46 (1998). With respect to a client's attempt to conceal docu-
ments by delivering them to her lawyer, consider the reference in the book to Riley's personal
lawyer, Mary Ryan, admitting "that she had 'tannery documents coming out of my ears,"' some
of which were at her office, others of which were at a warehouse. HARR, supra note 1, at 481.
These documents included the chemical formula books that could have been relevant to the case.
Id. In her defense, Ryan argued that Schlictmann had never asked for the documents and was
"Iaware of numerous, numerous files that were not searched."' Id. A professor might question
students how a lawyer, in possession of such documents, should respond to a document request
directed to the client which requests all documents "in your [i.e., the client's] possession."
147. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 (comparing the duty of confidentiality with
the attorney client privilege, stressing that unlike the privilege, which requires that the confiden-
tial information have been acquired from the client, the duty applies regardless of the source of
the information).
149. Comment 4 to Model Rule 1.6 notes:
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain
confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby
encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing
or legally damaging subject matter.
150. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(b), (f) (Conflicts of Interest: Prohibited Transac-
tions); Rule 1.9 (Conflict of Interest: Former Client]; Rule 1.10 (Imputed Disqualification:
General Rule); Rule 1.11 (Successive Government and Private Employment). See infra notes
195-202 and accompanying text.
151. See MODEL RULE Rule 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal). See also Nix v. White-
side, 475 U.S. 157 (1986); Monroe H. Freeman, Perjury: The Lawyer's Trilenmna, 1 LITIGATION
26 (1975).
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application: it protects only qualified"5 2 lawyer-client communications
from compelled disclosure. The duty not to disclose, however, applies
in every other situation involving confidential client information"3
where the privilege does not apply. What this means is that a lawyer
may not voluntarily disclose confidential client information. This pro-
scription applies regardless of the source of the confidential informa-
tion.' Whereas the privilege applies only to communications between
client and lawyer, the duty applies even where the lawyer has obtained
the information from a third person.15
The Rule 11 hearing raised the issue of the attorney-client privi-
lege, which applies in judicial and other proceedings where a lawyer
might be called as a witness or compelled to produce evidence con-
cerning a client. Thus, the attorney-client privilege prevented
Cheeseman and Facher from revealing the contested information
without Riley's consent. Imagine now, however, that Cheeseman was
trying to decide whether to use the Gamache-Riley conversation as the
basis for a barratry allegation in his Rule 11 motion. Could he have
152. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (discussion of what kinds of communi-
cations qualify for the privilege).
153. Because the privilege protects only communications between client and lawyer, it is
relatively easy to eliminate what is not protected; unless the alleged protected conversation
involved the lawyer or client (or one of their agents) or the alleged protected document was sent
between the lawyer and client, it cannot come within the privilege. Confidential information
subject to the duty not to disclose, however, does not require this client-lawyer nexus. How then
does a lawyer determine what information is subject to the duty? The Model Rules state that a
"lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client .... " MODEL RULES
Rule 1.6(a) (emphasis added). The information need only be related to the lawyer's representa-
tion of the client; implied in this is that the information may have been obtained from any
source. Model Code DR 4-101(B) provides "a lawyer shall not knowingly," except for certain
exceptions, "[r]eveal a confidence or secret of his client." DR 4-101(A) defines "confidence" and
"secret":
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client."
The protected client information under the Model Rules is somewhat broader than under the
Model Code: any information related to the representation is protected, regardless of whether
the client has specifically requested the lawyer to maintain its confidentiality, and regardless of
whether it is embarrassing to the client. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 (Model Code Comparison
para. 1).
154. See MODEL RULE 1.6 cmt. 5.
155. Indeed, some authorities contend the proscription on voluntarily disclosing client
confidential information applies even when the information has subsequently become publicly
known. See WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at § 6.7.4:
[V]oluntary disclosure of a secret that has become generally known should be treated
no differently than disclosure of any other client secret, unless it can be confidently
said that the information has become so much a matter of public record that general
knowledge of its content, its significance, and its public status is incontrovertible.
Id. at 303.
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 23:283
discussed the conversation with another lawyer in his law firm to get
that lawyer's opinion on the viability of the motion? Could he use the
conversation, similar to what I am doing here, to illustrate the differ-
ence between the attorney-client privilege and duty of confidentiality
in a course he is teaching at a local law school or at a bar-sponsored
continuing legal education (CLE) seminar? Could he have discussed
the conversation and its ramifications with a nonlawyer friend over
lunch?l"6 What constraints are there on Cheeseman's using the infor-
mation in these situations?
First, Cheeseman would have to treat the information he
received from Jacobs as confidential client information subject to the
confidentiality duty for the same reason he was able to assert the
privilege during the motion hearing-the "joint defense" or "pooled
information" doctrine.15 7  Therefore, Cheeseman generally may not
disclose the Riley-Gamache conversation.
Nevertheless, the ethical rules provide exceptions to the duty to
preserve confidences. One exception is that a lawyer may make "dis-
closures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the repre-
sentation. ' 158 Comment 8 to Model Rule 1.6 elaborates: "Lawyers in
156. See infra note 161.
157. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395
(1995) (obligations of lawyer who formerly represented a client in connection with a joint defense
consortium). Although Cheeseman might not owe a duty directly to Beatrice or the tannery, he
would be obligated not to disclose the information because of his duty to his client Grace not to
disclose information "relating to the representation." Moreover, in the unlikely event he were to
subsequently represent a party with interests adverse to Beatrice in an action against Beatrice that
is substantially related to the Woburn case, he likely would be disqualified. See, e.g., Wilson P.
Abraham Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977) (dis-
qualifying lawyer for suing former codefendant of client he had represented where there was a
substantial relationship in the subject matter of the two representations and confidential infor-
mation was shared in the prior representation).
158. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(a). Model Rule 1.6 also has other exceptions that include
allowing, but not mandating, a lawyer to reveal information to prevent the client from commit-
ting a criminal act that will "likely result in imminent death or substantial bodily injury," or to
defend herself in litigation between the client and her, or to defend against charges arising from
the client's conduct or the services the lawyer has provided the client. MODEL RULES Rule
1.6(b)(1),(2). California alone does not provide any explicit exceptions to its confidentiality rule,
although it does provide a "criminal act" exception to the assertion of the attorney-client privi-
lege. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (1990) (It is the duty of a lawyer "[t]o
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself, to preserve the secrets,
of his or her client") with CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 ("There is no privilege ... if the lawyer
reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication relating to representation
is necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely
to result in death or substantial bodily harm."). There is at present a debate in California
whether the exception to the attorney-client privilege in section 956.5 of the California Evidence
Code also applies to the confidentiality duty set forth in section 6068(e) of the California Evi-
dence Code. See, e.g., State Bar of California, Office of Professional Competence, Planning and
Development, Request That The Supreme Court of California Approve Proposed Rule 3-100 of
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a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice disclose to each other
information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has
instructed that particular information to be confined to specified law-
yers."' 9 Cheeseman's seeking advice from his colleague in the firm
would thus be permitted.
Cheeseman's use of the same information in a law school or CLE
hypothetical would probably be permitted, so long as he took precau-
tions to preserve its confidentiality. The key concern is that he not
disclose so much information that the listener would be able to iden-
tify the client he represents and the relevance of the information.
Again, assume that his class or seminar meets while he is still deciding
whether to include the barratry allegations in his motion. As an initial
matter, using information for a "good cause," for example, legal edu-
cation, is not a recognized exception to the confidentiality duty.
Nevertheless, his use of the Gamache-Riley conversation to drive
home a point about the client-lawyer privilege would not violate the
ethical codes so long as he took precautions so that the identities of the
client (Riley) and case were not disclosed. On its face, this would
appear to be easy; all he would have to do is avoid referring to Riley or
Gamache by name and avoid mentioning the location of the suit.
Not disclosing names and locations, however, may not be suffi-
cient. In this case, it is likely that merely relating the facts would
reveal both the case and the parties, thus violating the duty to preserve
confidences. First, the Woburn case was well-publicized. There is
always a danger that just mentioning the facts would reveal the case
and, thus, confidential information. 6 ' Second, Cheeseman may have
mentioned to his class earlier in the semester that he was involved in
the Woburn suit, or given the case's notoriety, his name would have
the Rule of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California and Memorandum and Sup-
porting Documents in Explanation, at 3-4 (May 1998). The debate remains unresolved. On
three separate occasions since 1987, the State Bar of California has submitted to the California
Supreme Court proposed revisions to the California Rules that would create express exceptions
to the confidentiality rule set out in section 6068(e) of the California Business and Professions
Code. In 1987, the bar withdrew its proposal in the face of questions by the court. See Nancy
McCarthy, Proposed Rule May Permit Breach of Confidentiality, CAL ST B.J. 1, 22 (July 1997).
In 1993, the supreme court rejected the proposal without comment. Id. Finally, on September
2, 1998, the court issued a minute order, again rejecting without comment the proposed revision.
See Minute Order--070520, Request That the Supreme Court Approve Rule 3-100 Request
Denied (Cal. Sept. 2, 1998).
159. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 8.
160. In the externship programs at our law school, we place students with judges, law
firms, and government agencies. A requirement of all our externships is that the students keep
journals reflecting on their experience. We caution the students to exercise extreme caution
when they are working on a high-profile case. We remind them that even elliptical references to
certain facts may disclose the identity of the case and result in disclosure of confidential client or
chambers information.
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appeared in news reports as representing Grace. Thus, his students
may have known he was involved even if he said nothing. Moreover,
the lawyers attending his CLE seminar probably would be familiar
with pending high-profile cases and the participants and, if nothing
else, Woburn was notorious. In any case, it is likely his students
would know he was involved in the case.
Thus, if he were to present the hypothetical by saying, for exam-
ple, "an interesting situation arose in a case I am currently working
on," and then referred to a conversation between one of the plaintiffs
and the president of a defendant "facility" alleged to have polluted the
environment, the students might be able to determine that Riley was
involved, even if Cheeseman had never mentioned Riley, the tannery,
or Woburn by name.161 Cheeseman would have revealed Riley's con-
fidential information without Riley's consent and, thus, would have
violated his ethical duty, even though he had not identified the name
of the case or the names of any of the persons involved.
The foregoing hypothetical presumed Cheeseman wanted to use
the information while the case was still active. Even if he wanted to
use the same information several years later, he would still have to take
precautions if the information had not become generally known as it
161. In some instances, it is conceivable that a person to whom information is being relayed
could decipher who the players are and what case is involved even without the lawyer having told
the other person who his client is. For example, imagine that a computer hacker was arrested,
convicted, and imprisoned several years ago. From prison, the hacker calls Lawyer, who lives in
a city near the prison, to see if Lawyer can help him sell the media rights to his story. During the
conversation, the hacker reveals information that is not known publicly to Lawyer. Lawyer
replies he cannot help the hacker and that evening has dinner with a friend who owns a business
that sells goods on the Internet. His friend previously had complained that he had been having
trouble maintaining the security of his computer servers and had lamented the hacker culture
that treated breaking into computers as a game. At any rate, Lawyer mentions that just that day
he has spoken with a computer hacker in prison who wanted help in selling his story and then
reveals some of the details of his conversation with the hacker. Lawyer does not identify the
hacker by name, nor does he even reveal where the hacker is located. Despite Lawyer's not
identifying the hacker or where he is located, it is possible the friend will be able to identify who
the hacker is and learn the hacker's confidential information.
For example, because he owns a business involved in selling goods on the Internet, the friend
likely will be aware of computer security matters, and could very well know the names of some
computer hackers. In addition, because the prison is located near the city where the lawyer and
friend live, it is more likely the friend may be aware of the hacker. Moreover, because the friend
had previously complained to Lawyer about computer hackers, Lawyer probably should have
been aware his friend might be familiar with the hacker and not mentioned any details of the
conversation to the friend.
Finally, note that Lawyer has a duty not to disclose the hacker's confidential information
even though he turned down the representation. When a prospective client consults a lawyer in
good faith to obtain legal representation, the duty of confidentiality applies even though the law-
yer declined the representation and did not perform any legal services. See ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (1990); CAL. EVID. CODE § 951.
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did by publication of the book.162 The duty of confidentiality survives
the termination of the representation.'63 The result is that the lawyer
cannot ever use the information to the client's disadvantage,1 64 and will
be disqualified from subsequently representing a person with interests
adverse to the first client in a later, substantially related matter.
1 65
C. The Lawyer's Duty to Not File Frivolous Motions
Returning to the barratry allegations, we need to address the last
issue raised about Cheeseman's assertion that the privilege attached to
the Gamache Riley conversations: Should Cheeseman simply have
obtained Riley's waiver before filing the motion? It might appear to
even a casual reader that Cheeseman should have obtained Riley's
waiver. After all, Riley would have had to testify about the Gamache
incident if called to testify and the barratry assertion implicated
Schlictmann's professional reputation. 06 It might seem fairness obli-
gated Cheeseman to disclose to Schlictmann the evidence supporting
the barratry assertion. This scenario raises two often conflicting
duties of a lawyer: the lawyer's duty of loyalty to her client (and to
zealously advocate her client's position) and the lawyer's duty as an
officer of the legal system.'67 The question becomes whether a lawyer
has to "split hairs," that is, assert every viable claim on behalf of the
client. There is no simple answer to this question, except perhaps "it
depends."
Model Rule 1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with reason-
able diligence and promptness in representing a client., 68 Comment
1 to Rule 1.3 further states that a lawyer
should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition,
162. Some commentators argue that a lawyer is precluded even from using client informa-
tion that has become public. See supra note 120.
163. The attorney-client privilege also survives the death of the client. See supra notes 119-
20 and accompanying text.
164. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(b).
165. MODEL RULES Rule 1.9.
The rationale behind this rule is as sound as it is elementary. The confidences com-
municated by a client to his attorney must remain inviolate for all time if the public is
to have reverence for the law and confidence in its guardians .... [T]he client must
be secure in his belief that the lawyer will be forever barred from disclosing confi-
dences reposed in him.
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
166. Although one can argue that Schlictmann's complaints about his reputation were self-
serving and overblown, Judge Skinner recognized he was obligated under Massachusetts law to
report Schlictmann to the bar for possible sanctions in the event he concluded the assertions were
accurate. HARR, supra note 1, at 112.
167. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
168. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3.
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obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may
take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindi-
cate a client's cause or endeavor .... [and] should act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.69
Comment 1, however, also states "a lawyer is not bound to press
for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has
professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter
should be pursued.""17  Given the discretion a lawyer has to assert
positions on a client's behalf, Cheeseman appears to have acted ethi-
cally in asserting the defense of privilege to avoid disclosing the basis
for the barratry assertions."7
Further, Cheeseman's ethical stance does not appear to be other-
wise undermined by his status as an officer of the legal system 72 and
his duty to not file suits or bring motions that are frivolous. Model
Rule 3.1 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not bring ... a proceeding, or
assert... an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is
not frivolous ...""' The question then becomes whether the claim
or motion asserted is "frivolous." The Comment to Rule 3.1 states an
"action is frivolous ... if the client desires to have the action taken
primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person
or if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the
merits of the action taken .. ."'74 Here, Cheeseman could make a
169. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Moreover, consider Model Rules Scope para. 1, which, recognizing that certain ethical
rules are discretionary, explicitly states, "No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer
chooses not to act or acts with the bounds of such discretion."
172. See MODEL RULES Preamble para. 1 (a lawyer is an officer of the legal system). Para-
graph 4 provides:
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in profes-
sional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer
should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or
intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for
those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a
lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a
lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.
173. MODEL RULES Rule 3.1.
174. MODEL RULES Rule 3.1 cmt. 2. See also supra note 104 and accompanying text,
regarding the similarity between Model Rule 3.1 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The
equivalent California rule provides in part:
Prohibited Objectives of Employment
A member shall not seek, accept, or continue employment if the member knows or
should know that the objective of such employment is:
(A) To bring an action, conduct a defense, assert a position in litigation, or take
an appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or mali-
ciously injuring any person.
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good faith argument that Schlictmann had engaged in barratry, based
on the information about Gamache that Riley had provided to him. 7 '
Moreover, Cheeseman had a good faith, albeit technical, argument
that the privilege applied and he could not reveal the evidence under-
lying his motion.'76 Thus, Cheeseman did not violate any duties he
had to the justice system as an officer of the legal system.'77
Nevertheless, something still simply does not feel right about
Cheeseman's repeated assertions that he could not reveal the basis of
the barratry allegations. As just discussed, he may have been ethical
in advocating his client's position, and he may not have violated any
ethical duty as an officer of the legal system. Nevertheless, as we read
the details of the court hearing, we are almost embarrassed by his
insistence on the privilege, particularly after Facher stated he would
not have characterized the Gamache information as "highly specific
and direct.'
178
Why could Cheeseman not have simply obtained the waiver
from Riley before the hearing, or even before he filed the motion?
Although he may have acted within ethical guidelines set out in the
CAL. RULES Rule 3-200. The relevant Disciplinary Rule of the Model Code, DR 7-102(A)(1),
provides that a lawyer may not "[f]ile a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or
take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."
Both of these ethical codes focus, as do the comments to the Model Rule, on claims or
motions intended to "merely harass" the opponent.
175. Recall that Gamache had told Riley, "I didn't realize your tannery was part of the law-
suit. The lawyers were looking for people to join the case. All we want to do is stop the big
chemical companies from dumping." HARR, supra note 1, at 103.
176. See supra notes 124-28, 136-59, and accompanying text. Comment 2 to Rule 3.1 also
states that an "action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position
ultimately will not prevail." MODEL RULES Rule 3.1 cmt. 2. Thus, a lawyer can in good faith
assert a position even though he determines it probably will be rejected, as a lawyer might predict
for a technical argument based on a privilege.
177. There might be a question that Cheeseman made the barratry allegations and asserted
the privilege at least partially in an effort to harass Schlictmann. Recall that Cheeseman thought
Schlictmann's statements at the press conference upon the filing of the complaint were unprofes-
sional, HARR, supra note 1, at 98. Cheeseman also told Schlictmann his barratry allegations were
"no more outrageous than the allegations you've made against my client." Id. at 108. We have
the benefit of hindsight and know how the barratry allegations arose. It is helpful to remember
what information Cheeseman had when he filed the motion: he was relying on Riley's charac-
terization of his meeting with Gamache, as relayed by Jacobs. Cheeseman was not aware, as we
are, that there is a simple explanation why Gamache did not realize the tannery and Riley were
involved in the lawsuit: he was not present at the earlier meetings Schlictmann had with the
plaintiffs where he outlined the lawsuit. Id. at 102. Without this information, it would be natu-
ral to conclude that a party who did not even know who he was suing was being manipulated by
the lawyer. With this in mind, and given that Cheeseman had a reasonable legal and factual
basis for the motion, see supra notes 124-28, 136-39, and accompanying text, it would be difficult
to conclude he took the action merely to harass Schlictmann.
178. HARR, supra note 1, at 113-14.
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codes, he nevertheless left the hearing with egg on his face, having
failed miserably in what he set out to do for the judge, who never
really seriously considered the heart of Cheeseman's Rule 11 motion:
that Schlictmann had filed a frivolous suit. 7 9  Cheeseman attracted
both the skepticism and displeasure of the judge.180
Perhaps the most valuable lesson to be learned from the barratry
hearing, particularly for lawyers in training, is a practical lesson:
regardless of whether your position is nonfrivolous and is within the
ethical bounds of the codes, you have to assess the realities of the
situation, particularly when asserting a technical defense. Despite all
that is said about how trials are decided by which side tells its story
best, a judge will still generally view the function of the adversary
system in general, and the litigation process in particular, as a search
for the truth."' Although crafty procedural legerdemain might earn
179. It was not simply Schlictmann's argument over the privilege that appears to have worn
down the judge to the point where he lost enthusiasm for the hearing on the Rule 11, but also
Schlictmann's insistence that he could not testify about what he knew when he filed the lawsuit
because it would create a conflict with his clients. See infra Part IV.D. Nevertheless, the argu-
ments over privilege appear to have occupied most of the hearing, and it is fair to say that they
set the tone for the eventual questioning of Schlictmann by the judge. Given that Judge Skinner
eventually held that Schlictmann violated Rule 11 at least in part by filing the complaint, HARR,
supra note 1, at 487, the privilege assertion arguably was a fatal procedural error; but for the
drama that infused the Rule 11 hearing, the judge might have granted Cheeseman's motion.
The judge, however, did not actually hold that the original filing was frivolous. Id. In the
early stages of a lawsuit, judges are more willing to give plaintiffs time in discovery to work up
the necessary information to support their claims, particularly where the defendant possesses
most of the information necessary to prove the case. Indeed, that is expected under notice plead-
ing. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see, e.g., In re Boland, 79 F.R.D. 665 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that, as
Federal Rules merely require a short and plain statement of the claim and relief sought,
precomplaint discovery is not allowed as method for plaintiff to determine whether claim exists);
Mahon v. Bennett, 6 F.R.D. 213 (W.D. Mo. 1946) (holding that Federal Rules contemplate that
complaints should not be amplified or extended in view of discovery rules). On the other hand,
courts are split on whether a plaintiffs lawyer can avoid Rule 11 sanctions if discovery subse-
quently proves the complaint's allegations are well-founded, even though the lawyer had no
knowledge when first filing the complaint. See In re Keegan Management Co. Sec. Litig., 78
F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that imposition of Rule 11 sanctions was error and abuse of
discretion, as district court based its decision on erroneous view of the law by focusing on plain-
tiffs' attorneys' subjective knowledge at the time they filed complaint where, following discovery,
plaintiffs' pretrial evidence was enough to render their complaint nonfrivolous). But cf. Garr v.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming imposition of sanctions on lawyers
who failed to investigate facts before filing complaint, even though subsequent discovery
revealed complaint was accurate.)
180. Indeed, even Cheeseman felt the motion hearing shadowed him in the suit. HARR,
supra note 1, at 141 (noting that Cheeseman felt the Rule 11 motion had "come back to haunt
him" when Judge Skinner denied his motion for summary judgment).
181. One commentator has written that judges act upon the assumption that "the law is
structured by a coherent set of principles about justice and fairness and procedural due process,"
and judges "enforce these in the fresh cases that come before them, so that each person's situa-
tion is fair and just according to the same standards." RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 243
(1986). See also David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990).
Legal Ethics
your peers' admiration, it will often infuriate a judge who wants a liti-
gant to have his day in court. Along these lines, any privilege, whe-
ther it be attorney-client, priest-penitent, or physician-patient, neces-
sarily interferes with the truth-seeking function of the system.
Therefore, the judges who preside over the system will often be
skeptical of a privilege claim. Where, as in this case, the asserted priv-
ileged nature of the Jacobs-Ryan consultation is razor thin, a lawyer
might well confer with his client and advise the client that, in the long
run, it might not be in the client's best interests to assert it.1
8 2
D. Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty to Client
Much of the drama of the Rule 11 hearing derives from Schlict-
mann's repeated refusals to take the stand and testify regarding the
allegations that the complaint he and Roisman had filed was base-
less.' 3 Judge Skinner decided that the best way to determine what
Schlictmann and Roisman knew when they filed the complaint and,
thus, whether they had sufficient facts to support a non-frivolous
complaint, was for one of plaintiffs' lawyers, Schlictmann or Roisman,
"to take the witness stand and answer questions by the defendant's
attorney.""1 4  Schlictmann refused on the ground that he could "no
longer be a professional, objective advocate for my clients." '185
Putting aside the soundness of Judge Skinner's approach,8 6 the
primary issue here is the lawyer's duty of loyalty to his clients.
182. The reader has probably noticed that I have not discussed whether a lawyer should do
what is moral and not just what is ethical. As one commentator has noted, "[dirafting [ethical
codes] is inherently a process of finding the lowest common denominator" because if the result is
too strong or radical a position, "a powerful segment of lawyers will fird them too odious or
unprofitable to obey," with the result that the rule will be widely ignored because of competitive
pressures and a sense of unfairness. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 49 (citing David Luban,
Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Lawyers' Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV.
451, 460-61 (1981)). Because the mandatory provisions of the codes set out an ethical minimum,
there is a large area between conduct required of a lawyer and conduct that is aspirational. The
recognition of this gap has spawned a rich literature of opinion that could be a springboard for an
excellent class discussion on the place of morals in the law. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 22;
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 592 (1985);
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
183. HARR, supra note 1, at 115-17.
184. Id. at 115.
185. Id. at 116.
186. All of the judges who have appeared at Western State's Panel Discussions on Ethics in
A Civil Action, see supra note 11, found Judge Skinner's position to be curious or unusual. None
of them would have ordered Schlictmann to take the stand under these circumstances, preferring
to make any determinations by affidavit. Part of that view may be due to their aversion to Rule
11-type motions and concern that it can be used primarily as a tactical device to harass an oppo-
nent. Even Facher appears to have recognized that such motions usually fail. See HARR, supra
note 1, at 104. At any rate, the idea of allowing a lawyer to cross-exanine an opposing lawyer
this early in the proceedings did not appeal to the judges.
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Schlictmann's concern was that his loyalty to the Woburn plaintiffs
was threatened, as his answers to Cheeseman's questions could have
resulted in the dismissal of the case.187 As already noted, loyalty is
central to the adversary system, advanced by the lawyer's duties to
provide competent and diligent representation, preserve client confi-
dential information, communicate with the client, and avoid conflicts
of interest 8 The ethical rules that address conflicts of interest are
crucial to ensuring the lawyer's duty of loyalty.
1 89
Each of the ethical codes has a provision that prohibits a lawyer
from simultaneously acting as advocate and witness. 9 ' Where the
lawyer is testifying favorably for the client, the rule is intended to
avoid confusing the jury as to the lawyer's two roles in such situations:
on the one hand, as a witness who is required to testify based on per-
sonal knowledge and, on the other hand, as an advocate who "is
expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others."' 9
Thus, where the lawyer would testify favorably to the client, the rule
is intended more to protect the opposing party, the rationale being that
a lawyer's testifying about facts under oath will project favorably on
her functioning as an advocate, arguing on behalf of her client. Where
the lawyer's testimony is adverse to the client's interests, however, the
greater concern is that the resulting conflict of interest will call into
question the lawyer's loyalty and undermine the attorney-client
relationship.192
Here, Schlictmann's testimony could have resulted in the case
being dismissed. If Schlictmann and Roisman did not have sufficient
facts to support the allegations in the complaint, the court could have
dismissed the complaint to the detriment of the Woburn families.'93
Thus, Schlictmann's testimony was potentially adverse to his clients,
187. In reaffirming that he intended to have Schlictmann testify, Judge Skinner told
Schlictmann, "[i]f you filed the [complaint] without making some kind of investigation, then I'll
strike the complaint." HARR, supra note 1, at 115.
188. See supra Part II.D.
189. See MODEL RULES Rules 1.7-1.11, 3.7.
190. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.7, which provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the
case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.
See also CAL. RULES Rule 5-210; MODEL CODE DR 5-101(B), DR 5-102(A).
191. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7 cmt. 2; Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 362
(N.D. Ill. 1994). See also CAL. RULES Rule 5-210 Discussion (explaining that the rule does not
apply where the lawyer is to testify before a judge).
192. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7 cmt. 5.
193. See supra note 179.
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creating a conflict between Schlictmann and his clients. It is primarily
the responsibility of the lawyer to determine whether such a conflict
exists.194 Schlictmann believed a conflict existed and might have had
to disqualify himself from representing the families. 9S
A professor, however, could challenge a class by suggesting that
Schlictmann was grandstanding by his refusal to testify. After all, the
discussion following the California rule notes that the rule is inappli-
cable where the lawyer is to testify before a judge rather than a jury.'96
That comment, however, recognizes that the primary concern when a
lawyer is giving testimony favorable to the client-that the trier of fact
will confuse the lawyer's two roles as witness to the facts and advocate
whose duty is to argue the facts--does not apply when a judge is the
trier of fact. Presumably, a judge should be able to distinguish the
lawyer's two roles.197 The comment would not apply to a situation like
Schlictmann's, where the lawyer is giving testimony that is potentially
adverse to his client.1
98
The judge and parties resolved the dilemma created by Judge
Skinner's procedure by having the judge, rather than Cheeseman,
question Schlictmann. This, however, was not necessarily the proper
solution. Regardless of who was asking the questions, Schlictmann
still would have had to give the same testimonyY" If his testimony
would create a conflict when Cheeseman asked the questions, it is dif-
ficult to see how having the judge ask the questions would avoid the
conflict.
Finally, although Judge Skinner eventually concluded that
Schlictmann had violated Rule 11, at least as to the allegations against
Beatrice,"' he denied Cheeseman's motion in these early stages of the
194. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7 cmt. 5.
195. See, e.g., People v. Beals, 618 N.E.2d 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (testifying against a cli-
ent violates Model Rule 3.7 when the lawyer reasonably should have known the testimony would
be adverse to the client's case).
196. CAL. RULES Rule 5-210 Discussion ("This rule is not intended to encompass situa-
tions in which the member is representing the client in an adversarial proceeding and is testifying
before a judge.").
197. For the same reason, appellate courts will generally not overturn a bench trial verdict
in a civil case, even though evidence presented would have been prejudicial at a jury trial,
because a judge is presumed to be able to weigh the evidence and exclude from her deliberations
improper evidence. See, e.g., B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE §§ 30-32 (3d ed. 1986).
But cf. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) (holding that no deference is given to a judge in
a bench trial where there is a reasonable possibility that inadmissible evidence may have contrib-
uted to the defendant's conviction).
198. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a) ("Candor Toward the Tribunal, which provides
that a "lawyer shall not knowingly... (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal.") See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(d) (1990).
200. HARR, supra note 1, at 487.
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litigation. Thus, the conflict issue was never squarely addressed at the
earlier Rule 11 hearing. Nevertheless, the Rule 11 motion and Schlict-
mann's refusal to take the stand provide an excellent springboard for a
discussion of conflict of interest rules, an important part of any profes-
sional responsibility course.
V. WHEN A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES CONFLICT
We have examined in some detail the attorney-client privilege
and the lawyer's duty of confidentiality, and noted how the latter is
central to resolving other ethical issues that confront a lawyer.2"' Per-
haps the most wrenching problem a lawyer confronts arises when he
realizes his client has lied, either in court testimony or in responses to
discovery. At that point, two of the lawyer's roles conflict: as advo-
cate for her client and as an officer of the legal system. Should the
lawyer disclose the client's fraud on the system? Or should the lawyer
remain loyal to the client and not disclose the information she has
obtained from a confidential client communication?
The facts surrounding the Barbas deposition set the stage for a
discussion of the quandary a lawyer can confront when her ethical
duties are in conflict. The Barbas situation also provides a spring-
board to a broader discussion on client perjury.
A. The Barbas Deposition Facts-An Illustration of Conflicting Duties
Several factual situations in A Civil Action raise these issues,
including the events surrounding the deposition testimony of Grace
employee Thomas Barbas." 2 During his deposition, Mr. Barbas, a
painter at Grace's Woburn plant, stated that while he may have dis-
posed of cleaning solvents in the drainage ditch behind the Grace
plant during his first few months of work, he subsequently emptied
the solvents into fifty-five-gallon drums." 3 He denied having partici-
pated in dumping the filled drums of solvent into a pit behind the
plant, claiming to have heard only that drums had been dug up and
201. See supra notes 39, 182-99, and accompanying text. In particular, a lawyer's duty of
confidentiality is central to resolving many conflicts of interest questions and client testimonial
perjury, the subject discussed in the following paragraphs.
202. The alleged concealment of the Yankee Engineering Report, and Riley's removal of
the contaminated sludge from his property, HARR, supra note 1, at 469-70, are the main focus of
discovery misconduct in the book, and, as noted above, may be why readers are left with the
impression ethics took a back seat in trying the case. See id. at 460, 469-70. Although these two
events would allow for an excellent discussion on a lawyer's duty where the client has lied or
obstructed the case, they are beyond the scope of this introduction to using A Civil Action to
teach legal ethics.
203. ld. at 158.
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removed.2"4 Schlictmann subsequently learned at a meeting with
another Grace employee, Al Love, that Barbas had been lying."'
At about the same time that Schlictmann met with Love, Barbas
contacted Cheeseman to tell him that he now remembered being
involved in dumping the drums containing solvent into the pit.
20 6
204. Id. at 159.
205. The meeting between Schlictmann and Love, arranged by Anne Anderson, took place
at Love's house. Id. at 168-69. Schlictmann's meeting with Grace's employee Love raises
another issue: whether he contacted a represented person in violation of Model Rule 4.2, which
provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the rep-
resentation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter,
unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so." Cheeseman had
not consented to Schlictmann's talking with Love, so the question is whether Love can be
deemed to have been represented by Cheeseman, or any other lawyer, for that matter.
Comment 4 to Model Rule 4.2 states that when the person is an employee of an organization,
the lawyer must seek permission from the organization's lawyer to contact a person "having a
managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization" or whose "act or omission in connection
with that matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or
whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization." See also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995); CAL. RULES Rule
2-100(B) (defining "party"). The purpose behind limiting the employees who are deemed repre-
sented by corporate counsel is to prevent the organization's lawyers from insulating all employees
from contacts with opposing lawyers by asserting a blanket representation of the organization.
Id. See also Wider Sports Equip. Co., Ltd. v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502, 508-09 (D.
Utah 1996) (holding that if the rule is read too broadly, it would shelter "organizations, corpora-
tions and other business enterprises from the legitimate less costly inquiry and fact-gathering
process sometimes necessary to make a legitimate assessment of whether a valid claim for relief
exists"); Niesig v. Team, 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that covered employees are
those whose acts or omissions in matter that is subject of representation are binding on the cor-
poration or imputed to it for liability, or who are implementing the advice of corporate counsel).
Love was not a member of management, but it appears he was in a position to bind the cor-
poration by his admissions, having been personally involved in the polluting activities. More-
over, because he was named as a deponent in the litigation, had met with Cheeseman just after
his deposition and before he met with Schlictmann, HARR, supra note 1, at 166-67, and eventu-
ally approached the United States Attorney with information about Grace, id. at 171-72, it is
likely that Love fits within the protected class of corporate employees whom Schlictmann should
not have contacted without Cheeseman's permission.
Further, even if Love had approached Schlictmann, Schlictmann still must obtain permission
from the employee's counsel, in this case Cheeseman. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995). Finally, it should be noted that Model Rule 4.2
would not have applied to Schlictmann's meetings with former employees of Grace. E.g., HARR,
supra note 1, at 169-71; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-
396 n.47 (1995); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359
(1991).
The relevant California rule restricts communication with a "represented party." In the
organizational context, the rule defines "party" in the same way as the MODEL RULES: "'party'
includes: (1) An officer, director or managing agent of a corporation ... ; or (2) an employee of
[a] corporation .... if the subject of the communication is any act or omission of such person in
connection with the matter which may be binding upon or imputed to the organization for pur-
poses of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of
the organization." CAL. RULES Rule 2-100(B)(1), (2).
206. HARR, supra note 1, at 172.
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Cheeseman now confronted a situation where he knew Barbas, an
employee of his client, had lied during his deposition. Cheeseman
resolved this crisis by calling Schlictmann and telling him "I won't
object if you want to depose Barbas again. "207 When Schlictmann
asked him to explain "what's going on," Cheeseman explained that
Barbas had remembered emptying drums into the pit.208
B. Duty of Confidentiality Versus Duty to Legal System
Model Rule 1.6, the lawyer's duty of confidentiality, and Model
Rule 3.3, the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal, are in conflict
when a lawyer's client lies. Model Rule 1.6 prohibits a lawyer from
disclosing "information relating to the representation of a client"
except under certain circumstances.2 9 Moreover, even where these
circumstances exist, the rule states only that a lawyer "may" reveal the
information; it does not mandate the lawyer's disclosure.210 Whether
to reveal such information is thus discretionary with the lawyer.
211
On the other hand, Model Rule 3.3 imposes on a lawyer a duty
of candor toward the tribunal. It provides "[a] lawyer shall not know-
ingly.., offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer
has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the law-
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. These circumstances include situations where the client consents to disclosure or the
lawyer is impliedly authorized to disclose information, or where the lawyer believes revealing the
information is necessary to prevent the client's committing a criminal act the "lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or serious bodily harm," MODEL RULES Rules 1.6(b)(1), or
the lawyer believes revealing the information is necessary to defend the lawyer in cases in which
the client's conduct or the lawyer's conduct on behalf of the client is at issue. MODEL RULES
Rule 1.6(b)(2).
210. The Model Code is also permissive. "A lawyer may reveal... [t]he intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." MODEL CODE
DR 4-101(C)(3). States that adopt either the Model Rules or the Model Code are free to modify
them as they see fit. A number of states have amended their version of the Model Rules or
Model Code to make the lawyer's disclosure mandatory under certain circumstances. A recent
survey of the various state ethical codes (including the District of Columbia) identified 39 states
that have kept the codes' original language and provide an exception to the lawyer's confidential-
ity duty that allows a lawyer (the lawyer "may") to reveal the client's intention to commit a crime
likely to result in death or serious bodily injury, ten states make the duty to reveal in these cir-
cumstances mandatory (the lawyer "shall"), and one state code (New Mexico) provides the law-
yer "should" reveal such information. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 1999
SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 133-142 (Appendix A) (1999).
Only one state, California, which has adopted neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code, has
no explicit exception to the confidentiality duty. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)
(1990). See also supra note 158.
211. See MODEL RULES Scope para. 13 ("Other [rules], generally cast in the term 'may,'
are permissive and define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion.
No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the
bounds of such discretion.").
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yer shall take reasonable remedial measures." '212 Moreover, this duty
applies "even if compliance [with the rule] requires disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6." '213 Thus, if taking "rea-
sonable remedial measures" includes the lawyer's disclosing
confidential client information, the lawyer must disclose it, even where
Rule 1.6 provides no explicit exception.214
C. Cheeseman's Duties
Cheeseman's handling of the Barbas deposition provides the
basis for discussing not only how conflicting duties can arise, but also
212. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(4) (emphasis added); id. Scope para. 13 ("Some of the
Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms 'shall' or 'shall not.' These define proper conduct for
purposes of professional discipline.").
213. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(b). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-376 (1993):
A lawyer in a civil case who discovers her client has lied in discovery responses must
take all reasonable steps to rectify the fraud, which may include disclosure to the
court. In this context, the normal duty of confidentiality in Rule 1.6 is explicitly
superseded by the obligation of candor toward the tribunal in Rule 3.3. Lawyer must
first attempt to persuade client to rectify situation or, if that proves impossible, must
herself take whatever steps necessary to ensure a fraud is not perpetrated on the tribu-
nal. In some cases this may be accomplished by a withdrawal from the representation;
other cases may require disclosure to opposing counsel; finally, if all else fails, direct
disclosure to the court may prove the only effective remedial measure for client fraud.
See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 80-1458 (1980)
(duty of lawyer to disclose knowledge of inaccuracy in document produced during discovery).
But cf. Cal. Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct CAL 1983-74 (1983):
An attorney employed in a civil, nonjury trial does not have a duty to advise the court
that his/her client has committed testimonial perjury; the attorney is precluded from
divulging the perjury absent the client's consent. However, the attorney is required
promptly to pursue remedial action. If the remedial action fails, the attorney is
required to move to withdraw-but without disclosing any confidence or secret of
his/her client. If the attorney is unable to withdraw, the attorney may not use the
perjured testimony to support the client's claim.
214. See supra note 157. The rule speaks of the lawyer's duty of candor "toward the tribu-
nal." Because of the general prohibition on ex parte contacts with a judge or other judicial offi-
cer, see, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 3.5(b); CAL. RULES Rule 5-300(B), the lawyer in practice
must necessarily reveal the existence of any false evidence to the other side in the dispute. In
other words, by providing to the opposing party copies of all papers submitted with the court, as
the general prohibition on ex parte contacts requires, the lawyer necessarily will inform that party
of any false testimony. This is also true of the lawyer's duty "to disclose to the tribunal legal
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position
of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(3). In effect,
the lawyer must disclose authority adverse to the lawyer's client to the other side-even if the
other side is not aware of it.
Many of my students have reacted negatively to this latter requirement. The other side
should do its own work, they argue. The point of the rule, however, is not that the lawyer must
do her opponent's work, but instead that the tribunal-the court-must be kept fully apprised of
the applicable law so that it will apply the correct legal standards to the case before it. See
MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 cmt. 3.
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how a lawyer in practice might resolve the conflict. The broad conflict
issue is whether, by calling Schlictmann and telling him he would not
be opposed to having Barbas deposed again, Cheeseman acted ethi-
cally to resolve the apparent conflict between his duties as advocate
and as officer of the legal system. 215  There are two questions con-
tained in this broad issue statement: First, did Cheeseman have to
"take reasonable measures" to correct Barbas' testimony, that is, did
Barbas' testimony trigger Cheeseman's obligations under Model Rule
3.3? Second, assuming he was so required, did Cheeseman's calling
Schlictmann and telling him he could again take Barbas' deposition
constitute "reasonable remedial measures" within the meaning of Rule
3.3?
As to the first question, Barbas' deposition testimony was both
evidence and false. Even though it was Schlictmann who had noticed
the deposition, the "evidence"--or rather, Barbas' failure to reveal his
illegal actions-was offered in defense of Cheeseman's client, Grace.
The evidence was also "material"; to prove his case that Grace wasresponsible for his client's injuries, Schlictmann had to establish that
Grace had dumped chemical solvents in the ground. Finally, Cheese-
man knew Barbas had testified falsely when Barbas called and told
him he now remembered. These combined facts triggered the
requirement in Rule 3.3 that Cheeseman take "reasonable remedial
measures.
The second question asks what would have constituted "reason-
able remedial measures" in this situation. As an initial matter,
Cheeseman had learned that Barbas' testimony was false from Barbas,
one of his client's employees. Thus, any knowledge Cheeseman had
of the falsity of Barbas' testimony was based on confidential client
information, implicating the proscriptions of Rule 1.6216 and creating a
215. In a sense, Cheeseman's decision is not that difficult. Here, an employee of his cor-
porate client has come forth and admitted he had not told the truth. This is not a situation
where, for example, Cheeseman might have merely suspected that Barbas had not been forth-
coming in his testimony. Nor is this a situation where the client is telling the lawyer not to dis-
close the truth. In short, everyone here "appears to be on board" about the proper course to take.
216. As discussed previously, a corporation can act only through its managers and employ-
ees. Just as the corporation owns the privilege for purposes of deciding whether to waive it, a
lawyer owes a duty to the corporation to preserve confidential information relating to his repre-
sentation of the corporation that he learns from corporation employees. See supra notes 130-34
and accompanying text; MODEL RULES Rule 1.13 (Corporation as Client); CAL. RULES Rule 3-
600 (Organization as Client). The California rule explicitly states that a lawyer representing a
corporation may not violate her duty to protect client confidential information under section
6068(e) of the California Business and Professional Code when deciding how to proceed upon
gaining knowledge that an agent of the corporation may be acting in violation of law. CAL.
RULES Rule 3-600(B). Model Rule 1.13(b) also cautions the lawyer in making such decisions
about "the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the
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conflict between his duty not to disclose client information and his
duty of candor.
Should Cheeseman first have contacted Grace to obtain its per-
mission before calling Schlictmann, as the information regarding
Barbas' testimony was confidential information?217 He did not have to
do so. Model Rule 3.3 expressly identifies the lawyer's duty to rem-
edy false evidence even if it conflicts with the lawyer's duty of confi-
dentiality under Model Rule 1.6.218 Thus, although Cheeseman could
have called Grace as a courtesy to obtain their consent under Model
Rule 1.6, he was under no obligation to do so.219 Cheeseman thus
appears to have acted properly by calling Schlictmann about Barbas
and, when Schlictmann asked, confirming that Barbas now remem-
bered he was involved in dumping chemical solvents. Schlictmann
would now be able to correct, on the record, the previously false testi-
mony of Barbas.
The class discussion, however, need not stop here. Suppose
Cheeseman, in response to Schlictmann's inquiry "what's going on,"
organization."
217. See supra Part IV.B.1.
218. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(b). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-376 (1993) (lawyer's obligation where client lies in response to
discovery requests).
219. In addition, a professor could suggest that Cheeseman's decision to disclose Barbas'
false testimony was within his discretion to determine litigation strategy. Generally, it is the
lawyer's responsibility to make tactical litigation decisions. If one views Cheeseman's disclosure
as a litigation decision, then it was his to make, not Grace's. Calling Grace, then, may have been
a courtesy, but Grace would not have had veto power over his decision. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES Rule 1.2 cmt. 2:
Both lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in the objectives and means
of representation. The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be
served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's pro-
fessional obligations. Within those limits, a client also has a right to consult with the
lawyer about the means to be used in pursuing those objectives. At the same time, a
lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or employ means simply because a client
may wish that the lawyer do so. A clear distinction between objectives and means
sometimes cannot be drawn, and in many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes
of a joint undertaking. In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibil-
ity for technical and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the client regarding such
questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be
adversely affected. Law defining the lawyer's scope of authority in litigation varies
among jurisdictions.
The decision whether to reveal client confidences, however, is the client's, not the lawyer's.
Therefore, but for the fact Cheeseman had a duty of candor under Model Rule 3.3 that super-
seded his duty to preserve client confidences under Model Rule 1.6, Cheeseman would have had
to obtain Grace's consent to the disclosure. As for California, given the constraints of section
6068(e) of the California Business and Professional Code, Cheeseman would have had to contact
Grace for their permission to reveal the information. See, e.g., State Bar of Cal. Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Conduct CAL 1983-74 (1983), discussed supra note 212. If Grace
refused, then Cheeseman would have had to withdraw.
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had replied, "I'd really rather not say; just take my word that you
probably want to take Barbas' deposition again." Would Schlictmann
have understood what was going on, even if he had not already spoken
with Love? A discussion of this point will introduce students to a
practical aspect of legal practice and provide a springboard to a
broader discussion of client perjury.
Cheeseman's elliptical reference to Barbas' false deposition tes-
timony-"I won't object if you want to depose Barbas again"-
probably would have constituted "reasonable remedial measures" even
without further explanation. Lawyers often talk in a kind of code
when embarrassed or angered by what their clients have done.
2 0
Cheeseman's telling Schlictmann he would not object to Schlictmann's
taking Barbas' deposition again would have spoken volumes, even if
Schlictmann had not already spoken with Love. 2' Although Schlict-
mann had been practicing law for only half a dozen years, his
experience as a litigator would have already introduced him to this
lawyer "codespeak."
222
In a Professional Responsibility class, the Barbas incident would
also provide a suitable springboard for, or counterpoint to, a discus-
sion of client perjury in the criminal context. For example, a professor
could compare Cheeseman's statement to Schlictmann with the
approach recommended in the Model Rules,223 and endorsed by the
Supreme Court,224 for how a lawyer should handle the situation where
her criminal defendant client insists on taking the stand and giving
testimony the lawyer knows to be false. 2 Both the Barbas deposition
220. Perhaps "embarrassed" is not the proper word here. When faced with information
that undermines the case the lawyer is putting together, her first reaction is often a wish that it
will "just go away." She knows she must deal with the problem, but when she first becomes
aware of it, she can be overwhelmed, often to a state of paralysis or anger as much of the work
she has done is now rendered useless. Also weighing heavily on her mind will be the misrepre-
sentations her client has foisted on the other side, calling into question her professional integrity
for having allowed this information into the record in the first place.
Consider Cheeseman's reaction, as described by Harr: "Cheeseman, seated at his desk, had
the sensation of 'going suddenly cold,' he recalled later. He stood and looked out the window to
the courthouse as he listened to Barbas. He felt himself getting angry." HARR, supra note 1, at
172. It is no wonder then that Cheeseman would have first taken an elliptical route to telling
Schlictmann what had happened.
221. This is a valuable lesson for students. It is not intended so much to countenance this
approach to communicating information between lawyers, but to sensitize students to this fact of
the profession, so that they will understand what the opposing lawyer is really saying.
222. Indeed, Schlictmann had suspected Barbas had been lying during the deposition itself.
Id. at 160.
223. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 cmts. 7-10.
224. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
225. This is one of the more difficult areas of legal ethics. On the one hand, a lawyer has a
duty to competently represent her client. MODEL RULES Rule 1.1; CAL. RULES Rule 3-110.
To do this, she must first learn the facts. In learning the facts, however, she may realize the cli-
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and client perjury situations involve communications that can be
implied from words or actions.
Although the client has a constitutional right to testify in his
defense in a criminal trial and, thus, can insist on taking the stand, he
does not have a constitutional right to testify falsely.226 Therefore, if
the client intends to commit perjury and the lawyer knows this, his
insistence on taking the stand creates an irreconcilable conflict
between the lawyer's duty to zealously represent the client and her
duty of candor to the tribunal. The solutions to this dilemma pro-
posed by the Model Rules, intended to avoid the lawyer's having to
disclose directly the fact of her client's perjury, effectively communi-
cate that very fact.
For example, Model Rule 3.3 suggests the lawyer first should
seek to withdraw.227 The problem with this resolution is that the
client's intent to testify falsely may not become apparent until trial, at
which point a court would likely deny the lawyer's request to be
replaced.22 Moreover, bringing a motion to withdraw contemporane-
ously with or just before your client defendant takes the witness stand
signals to everyone in the courtroom that your client is about to com-
mit perjury.229 This is a striking example of how a lawyer's conduct
can result in an implicit disclosure of confidential information.'
ent has not told her the whole truth. Because she usually learns the facts from her client in con-
fidential communications, she has a second duty to preserve confidences. MODEL RULES Rule
1.6; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (1990). She also, however, has a third duty of candor
to the tribunal, that is, a duty to the system of justice. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3; CAL. RULES
Rule 5-200; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(d) (1990). A lawyer cannot comply with all three
of these duties when the client has, by words or actions, communicated to the lawyer that he will
commit perjury. This situation is referred to as the lawyer's "trilemma," and has given rise to a
substantial amount of debate over the last three decades. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 121- 23 (1990); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth:
An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1036 (1975).
226. See, e.g., Nix, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
227. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 cmt. 7.
228. See, e.g., id.
229. This is especially true because in these situations a lawyer must give some reason for
withdrawing, which is usually that there is an ethical conflict between lawyer and client. See,
e.g., People v. Jennings, 70 Cal. App. 4th 899 (1999); People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
230. Moreover, even if the lawyer did not first bring a withdrawal motion, another sug-
gested resolution of the conflict-to let your client take the stand and have the client testify in an
uninterrupted narrative-would have the same adverse communicative effect. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES Rule 3.3 cmt. 9. Several cases have expressly approved the narrative approach. See, e.g.,
Nix, 475 U.S. 157; Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817-18. A narrative testimony, particularly by a
criminal defendant testifying without guidance from his lawyer, runs so counter to accepted trial
practice that it is akin to hanging a sign around your client's neck that states "don't believe a
word I am saying." Even the comments to Model Rule 3.3 recognize that to permit the client to
testify by narrative "subjects the client to an implicit disclosure of information imparted to coun-
sel." MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 cmt. 9.
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Analogizing the client perjury approach to Barbas' testimony,
Cheeseman's calling Schlictmann to tell him that he would not object
to Schlictmann's taking Barbas' deposition probably would have con-
stituted "reasonable remedial measures" even if he had not explained
to Schlictmann what it was "all about. '231' This is not meant to coun-
tenance lawyer's "codespeak," but it is a reality of the profession, and
students should be made aware of it and cautioned to be sensitive to
the practice.
VI. FEES AND PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Legal fees can be a highly sensitive issue for lawyers. Regardless
of whether the client is pleased with the results the lawyer obtained,
large fees often lead to criticism about how much lawyers are paid.
Recently, there have been several cases where the fees the lawyers
stood to recover drew substantial criticism in the media. For example,
the enormous potential fees of the firms involved in the tobacco litiga-
tion have led politicians and other critics to complain. 2  In another
case that has garnered headlines, lawyers who represented victims of
the Holocaust and helped recover millions of dollars from Swiss banks
came under criticism for accepting any legal fees at all. 33
The problem is often one of perception and can affect even a cli-
ent whom a lawyer has successfully represented. Much of the time
spent by lawyers on the client's matter is done working behind the
scenes; time spent in court, conferring with the client, or otherwise
being involved in a visible activity is often a small portion of a litiga-
tor's time s.2 4 Even to the successful client, a one-line minute order or
even a thirty-page court opinion the judge issues on a motion for
231. In other words, Cheeseman's elliptical reference to taking another deposition is the
kind of disclosure that should have satisfied his duty to disclose false testimony to the tribunal.
See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
232. For example, one firm stands to recover over $800 million in fees for the part it
played, in association with states' attorneys general, in the tobacco settlement. See, e.g., Peter J.
Boyer, Big Guns, THE NEW YORKER, May 17, 1999, at 54, 58. See also Lester Brickman, Want
to Be a Billionaire? Sue a Tobacco Company, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1998, at All; Ann Davis,
Cashing in on the Tobacco Bonanza, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1998, at BI; Ann Davis, Lawyers Fil-
ing Tobacco Suits Cast as Villains, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1998, at B1; Myron Levin, Anti-
Tobacco Lawyers Rebuked Over Fees Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1998, at C2.
233. See Ann Davis, Holocaust Suit Settlement Spawns a Legal Fee Fight, WALL STREET J.,
Sept. 2, 1998, at Bi.
234. In A Civil Action, we get a behind-the-scenes look at numerous lawyer-lawyer and
lawyer-client conferences, but very little space is devoted to the time spent actually preparing to
take a deposition or researching the law that would go into the numerous briefs filed. When we
do get such a glimpse of lawyer preparation, it is usually by reference to the exhausted lawyers
rather than by actually describing the process. Legal research does not play well, either in prose
or on the screen.
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which the lawyer spent scores of hours preparing might not appear to
be worth the fee the lawyer charges.
It is lawyers who work on a contingent basis, however, who seem
to incur the greatest wrath. Unless her client prevails, the lawyer gets
nothing for the effort she put into the case. Nevertheless, where a
lawyer agrees to represent a client on a thirty or forty percent contin-
gency fee basis, she stands to recover hundreds of thousands or even
millions of dollars in fees if the jury awards a large verdict. Although
a lawyer may view a contingent arrangement as feast or famine235 and
must live with the latter, the public sees only the feasts and will sub-
ject those to criticism, arguing that the lawyer is only taking money
that more properly should go to the injured client.236
All of the ethical codes regulate legal fees. Because fees play a
large role in A Civil Action, the book is an excellent source from which
to examine the ethics concerning payment for legal services. As it is,
the prospect of earning fees or not contributes to much of the drama in
A Civil Action, as the cash-strapped firm of Schlictmann et al.
attempts to pursue the Woburn case against the defendants' seemingly
bottomless pockets. Without the fees they earned from other pending
lawsuits or the money they obtained by using potential fees as col-
lateral for loans, the firm would have been unable to continue funding
the lawsuit. The firm may even have been forced to settle the case
early or dismiss the suit without any recovery.237
Moreover, others besides the bank had a financial stake in the
case. Both Joe Mulligan, the lawyer who originally accepted the case,
and Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (TLPJ), the nonprofit group that
originally associated with Schlictmann to file the complaint but subse-
quently opted out, had claims on any legal fees the Woburn case
might generate. In light of the fee-sharing constraints in the ethical
codes,23 it is well worth asking whether these fee arrangements were
235. Judge John F. Grady, however, argues that because most uncomplicated personal
injury cases eventually settle, a lawyer does not risk much by taking the case on a contingent
basis. He concludes that because most such cases settle with little work required of the lawyer,
the majority of cases where a lawyer charges the "standard" one-third fee are "excessive by any
standard of reasonableness." John F. Grady, Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, 2
LITIGATION 20 (1976). But cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 94-389 (1994) (holding a contingent fee not unreasonable merely because case settles early,
removing much of risk of nonrecovery for client and lawyer).
236. Or, in the case of the tobacco litigation, to the taxpayers, by giving more of the settle-
ment to the government. See, e.g., Brickman, supra note 232.
237. In fact, but for the potential fees from the two "deep-pocket" defendants, Schlictmann
might not have continued to pursue the case after he left Reed & Mulligan. HARR, supra note 1,
at 79.
238. MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(e); CAL. RULES Rule 2-200(A). See also infra notes 251-67
and accompanying text.
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ethical, and even if they were, whether the fees Schlictmann paid
Mulligan and TLPJ out of the Grace settlement were reasonable given
the work each had actually performed on the case. Finally, the rela-
tionship Schlictmann's firm had with its financial advisors, Gordon
and Phillips, may have violated the ethical prohibitions on sharing fees
with nonlawyers.239
This section will explore the ethics of each of these financial
arrangements. The following discussion will demonstrate how A Civil
Action can be a convenient vehicle for teaching the ethics of legal fees.
A. Illustrations of Fee Sharing Arrangements Between
Lawyers in A Civil Action
Two instances arise in A Civil Action where lawyers denominate
fees as "referral fees." In one incident unrelated to Woburn, lawyer
Reed tried to persuade Schlictmann to let him handle the Piper Arrow
case. 4° If Schlictmann agreed, Reed "would pay Schlictmann a hand-
some referral fee when the case was settled, and Schlictmann would
not have to do any work."2 11 In addition, we are told that out of the
Woburn settlement, Schlictmann paid Mulligan, who had spent less
than a week working on the case, $350,000 to settle the suit Mulligan
had filed against Schlictmann for his "referral fee."
242
In addition to these "referral fees," Schlictmann associated with
TLPJ early during his involvement in the Woburn case.243 Under
their agreement, TLPJ's Executive Director Roisman took over as
lead counsel, with Schlictmann to remain as "local counsel. ' 244 They
239. Although Phillips is described as having a law degree, he no longer practiced law.
HARR, supra note 1, at 211.
240. The Piper Arrow case involved the crash of a single engine Piper Arrow plane in the
Long Island Sound, killing all aboard. One of the three passengers was a young divorcee, whose
ex-husband retained Schlictmann. The other two passengers retained Reed of Reed & Mulligan.
Id. at 63-64.
241. Id. at 64. As it turned out, Schlictmann turned down Reed's offer and, largely
through Schlictmann's efforts, the case settled quickly. Id. at 66.
242. Id. at 455. Recall that Mulligan, who believed the Woburn case was a potential "gold
mine," had convinced Schlictmann to take over the case while Schlictmann was still associated
with Reed & Mulligan. Id. at 67-68. When Schlictmann took over the case, there was a single
file folder less than an inch thick, indicating that "Mulligan had spent little time on the case."
Id. at 68. The file, which contained numerous newspaper clippings about Woburn, suggests that
law students hired by Mulligan for minimum wage, and told "to collect whatever pertinent infor-
mation they could find in Woburn," did most of the work done on the case before Schlictmann
became involved. Id. at 66-67.
243. We are told in fact that Schlictmann had gone to Woburn to tell the families he could
not continue on the case for lack of resources to pursue it. When he learned that Trial Lawyers
for Public Justice was looking for "a good environmental case," he decided to pursue that avenue.
Id. at 76.
244. Every federal district court and most state trial courts have a set of "local rules" in
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would split the case's costs equally and TLPJ would received two-
thirds of any fee that might result from a settlement, with the remain-
ing one-third going to Schlictmann.245
Nearly as soon as Roisman became involved, he had an assistant
gather information about the case and he and Schlictmann drafted the
complaint, filing it just days before the statute of limitations
expired.246
About two and a half years later, after Schlictmann had spent
tens of thousands of dollars responding to Cheeseman's summary
judgment motion, TLPJ decided that because there "can only be one
captain of the ship," and because Schlictmann had "put so much time
into the case already," they would let him "run with it. ' 247  TLPJ
would still take 12 percent of any settlement or judgment as a "fee for
its early work. 248 After the Grace settlement, Schlictmann paid TLPJ
$300,000 of the $648,000 they had demanded as their share of the fee.
Did either the Mulligan or TLPJ fee arrangement violate ethical
guidelines, either at their formation or in the final payout? There are
two questions for each arrangement: first, whether the arrangement is
ethical on its face and, second, assuming it is, whether the fee never-
theless constitutes an unreasonable or unconscionable fee.
B. Ethical Guidelines for Legal Fees
As an initial matter, the fee agreement between Schlictmann 249
and the Woburn plaintiffs violates no ethical rules. Contingent fees
are allowed by American law with only a few restrictions, the rationale
being that such a fee arrangement is often the only way a person can
"afford, finance and obtain the services of a competent lawyer."25
addition to the Federal or State Rules of Procedure that govern lawsuits in the courts generally.
These rules usually have a provision that requires an out-of-state lawyer who wishes to practice
in the court to associate with local counsel who reside in the judicial district and are licensed to
practice in that state. See, e.g., LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, Civ. RULES Rule 2.2.3.3.
245. HARR, supra note 1, at 77. Schlictmann would then split his one-third with Mulligan.
Id.
246. Id. at 78, 81.
247. Id. at 142. The Board members of TLPJ were appalled at the amount of money
Schlictmann was spending on the case. Id.
248. Id. at 142-43.
249. Actually, the original fee agreement was between Joe Mulligan and the plaintiffs. Id.
at 47-48.
250. MODEL CODE EC 2-20. Usually it is the plaintiff who enters into such arrangements,
but defendants in civil actions can also contract to pay their lawyers contingent on how much the
lawyer saves them. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-
373 (1993) (holding that a benefit to client cannot be inflated). Contingent fee arrangements,
however, are not permitted in criminal or domestic relations cases. See MODEL RULES Rule
1.5(d). The rationale for prohibiting a fee that is contingent on the lawyer's gaining an acquittal
19991
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Thus, the underlying arrangement between the lawyers and plaintiffs
is ethical.
Generally, however, a lawyer may not pay a finder's or referral
fee to another lawyer not in the same firm or promise to send business
to the other lawyer in return for business the other sends to him. This
prohibition on finder's fees or quid pro quo arrangements is virtually
universal in the United States.51 Payment of referral fees has gener-
ally been deemed contrary to public policy, resulting in dilution of the
lawyer's loyalty to the client and potentially creating conflicts of inter-
est, as well as creating the impression that the lawyers are brokering in
clients.5 2
Although the ABA Code strictly prohibits finder's fees, requir-
ing each of the participating lawyers both to provide some of the legal
services and to retain responsibility for the matter,25 3 the Model Rules
have relaxed the prohibition somewhat. Under Model Rule 1.5(e),
lawyers may divide a fee if "the division is in proportion to the serv-
ices performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the
client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representa-
for the defendant is that a conflict is created: to collect the fee, the lawyer would want to go to
trial and try to gain an acquittal, even though a plea bargain may be in the client's best interests.
In domestic relations cases, there is a concern that a contingent fee arrangement would inhibit
efforts by the parties at reconciliation, the lawyer's fee being dependent on her success at
recovering more of the marital estate for the client.
251. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(e); ABA Code DR 2-107(A); CAL. RULES Rule 2-
200(A).
252. WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 509-10. The editors of a legal newspaper criticized a
proposal to validate referral fees as amounting "to saying that a lawyer should be bribed to act
ethically. For it happens to be the unambiguous rule. . . that lawyers not competent to handle
cases should not handle them." NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Feb. 5, 1979, at 18, quoted in
MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 210, at 471. In short, a lawyer who has referred a case to a
specialist because he lacks the necessary expertise, or to another lawyer because he does not have
the time to devote to it, should not be paid for simply acting ethically.
A class discussion need not end here, however. A professor can note that the rules prohibit-
ing fee divisions with lawyers outside the firm-and which thus prohibit referral or finder's
fees--do not apply to "referrals" within a firm. Thus, even if a firm's "rainmaker" does no work
on a particular matter she brought to the firm, she will still receive part of the fee in the partner-
ship draw if a partner, or a bonus if an associate. Would not allowing referral fees enable sole
practitioners or small firms to take advantage of the expertise outside their firms in the same way
that large firms do? Keep in mind, however, that even rainmakers who do no work on a matter
retain responsibility for it by virtue of their membership in the firm and personal liability for the
partnership.
253. See MODEL CODE DR 2-107, which allows lawyers not in the same firm to share fees
only if (1) the client consents after the lawyers have fully disclosed they are sharing fees; (2) the
lawyers divide the fee "in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by
each" lawyer; and (3) the total fee the lawyers charge the client is not clearly excessive for the
total legal services provided. Note that the lawyers may not split fees unless both lawyers per-
form some services and retain responsibility for the matter, thus precluding payment of a finder's
fee to a lawyer who has simply forwarded the matter to another lawyer and not performed any
other services.
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tion,"24 the client is advised that both lawyers are participating in the
case and does not object,2"' and the total fee is reasonable. Thus,
unlike the ABA Code, which requires that both of the lawyers provide
services and retain responsibility, under the Model Rules a lawyer may
do either and still be allowed to share in the fee.256 This opens the way
for a lawyer to be paid a finder's fee, which is generally viewed as
payment for forwarding the case, so long as he retains responsibility
for the client's matter.25 7
C. Mulligan's Fee
With the foregoing ethical guidelines in mind, we can now ask
whether Schlictmann paying Mulligan a $350,000 "referral fee" was
an ethical violation. First, we do not know the specifics of the agree-
ment that Schlictmann and Mulligan entered into when Schlictmann,
Conway, and Crowley left Reed & Mulligan to form their own firm,
taking the Woburn case with them. At the time they would have
entered into such an agreement, however, they may have both been
lawyers in the same firm, Reed & Mulligan.258 None of the previously
discussed ethical rules would have applied, and they would have been
able to share fees in the manner they saw fit,25 9 subject to their obliga-
254. MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(e) (emphasis added).
255. The lawyers need not disclose they are dividing the fee, only which lawyers are par-
ticipating. Thus, they need not disclose the share each lawyer is to receive. MODEL RULES Rule
1.5 cmt. 4. Compare CAL. RULES Rule 2-200(A)(1), which requires that the lawyers disclose
not only that the fee will be divided, but also "the terms of such division."
256. Model Rule 1.5(e) requires the client's written consent only for a shared fee based on
joint responsibility; the client need not consent to the lawyers' division of fees based on the pro-
portion of work each has done.
257. California's rule goes further. Under California Rule 2-200(A), lawyers not in the
same firm can divide a fee if:
(1) The client has consented in writing thereto after a full disclosure has been made in
writing that a division of fees will be made and the terms of such division; and
(2) The total fee charged by all lawyers is not increased solely by reason of the provi-
sion for division of fees and is not unconscionable as that term is defined in rule
4-200.
CAL. RULES Rule 2-200A. There is no requirement that a lawyer being paid either perform
services or agree to assume responsibility for the matter so long as the client consents. Note,
however, that the lawyers must disclose to the client not only that they are dividing the fee, but
also "the terms of such division," that is, how much each lawyer is receiving.
258. We cannot be sure of this. Recall that Conway was not paid a salary at Reed & Mul-
ligan, but rather was paid on a case-by-case basis. HARR, supra note 1, at 70-72. It is not clear
whether Schlictmann had the same kind of arrangement.
259. Note, however, that the Piper Arrow arrangement Reed proposed, under which he
would pay Schlictmann a "handsome referral fee" and Schlictmann would not have to do any
work, would have been an improper finder's fee. At the time, Schlictmann was a sole practi-
tioner and was not associated with Reed & Mulligan. Under the Model Code, he and Reed
could not divide fees unless they both performed services and retained responsibility for the
matter. Under the Model Rules, they would either both have to participate in the case or obtain
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tions to communicate to the clients which lawyer was handling the
case.6' If we assume Schlictmann and Mulligan were members of the
same firm, then the fee paid to Mulligan, although denominated in the
book as such, was not a "referral fee."
Regardless of whether the fee arrangement was ethical, it should
still bother many readers and students that Mulligan received
$350,000 for less than a week's work on the case.261 Under those cir-
cumstances, the question becomes whether Mulligan receiving
$350,000 out of the $2.2 million in fees from the case was reason-
able.262
Model Rule 1.5(a) sets forth eight factors to consider in deter-
mining the reasonableness of the fee, 263 but the rule addresses whether
the total fee charged the client is reasonable, not whether the division
the client's consent to their retaining "joint responsibility" for the matter. MODEL RULES Rule
1.5(e). Only under California's rule would the arrangement Reed proposed have been ethical,
but they would still have to obtain the client's consent after full disclosure of the fee division.
260. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.4 (duty to keep client reasonably informed about the
status of a matter); CAL. RULES Rule 3-500 (duty to keep client "reasonably informed" about
"significant developments" relating to the representation).
261. HARR, supra note 1, at 455, at 66-68. See also supra note 242 and accompanying text.
262. The $2.2 million fee represented 28% of the total settlement, less than the 40% fee
originally agreed to in the contingent fee agreement with Mulligan. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to determine whether the 40% contingency fee was reasonable under the circumstances.
Many states have special requirements for contingent fee agreements, including that it be in writ-
ing and include disclosure as to how costs and disbursements will affect the contingency fee and
the client's recovery, and a statement that the fee is negotiable. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6147 (1990). See also MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(c) (providing that a fee may be contin-
gent on the outcome of the matter and requiring the fee agreement must be in writing, state the
percentages the lawyer will recover, and state the method by which the fee will be calculated, for
example, whether costs and disbursements will be deducted before or after the contingent fee is
calculated).
263. Model Rule 1.5(a) provides:
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining
the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993)
(billing for professional fees, disbursements and other expenses). Both the Model Code and
California Rules also have multiple factors that need to be balanced to determine if a fee is not
"clearly excessive" or not "unconscionable," respectively. MODEL CODE DR 2-106(B); CAL.
RULES Rule 4-200(B).
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of fees between or among lawyers is reasonable. Indeed, Rule 1.5(e)
regarding division of fees does not require the division to be "reason-
able," only that the "total fee" be reasonable. The concern generally is
that lawyers "divide" only the fee to which they are entitled by the
legal services they have performed, and do not encroach on the portion
of the recovery that belongs to the client. Thus, so long as the total fee
charged the client is reasonable, which is probably true here as it rep-
resents only twenty-eight percent of the total recovery, Mulligan can
claim his $350,000.264
D. TLPJ's Fee
In addition to the $350,000 Schlictmann paid Mulligan out of the
Woburn fees, Schlictmann and TLPJ settled for a $300,000 fee, sub-
stantially less than the $648,000 TLPJ originally sought for "Rois-
man's early assistance. 2 65  Under its agreement with Schlictmann,
TLPJ was to be lead counsel, and it would split expenses with
Schlictmann and be entitled to two-thirds of any fee recovered.
66
264. It is important to distinguish between Mulligan's legal right to the $350,000, which
would depend on a contract law analysis, and whether his receiving the $350,000 is ethical. It is
beyond the scope of this Article-and the facts given in the book-to determine whether Mulli-
gan had a legal right to his fee. HARR, supra note 1, at 77. Mulligan, however, filed suit to
recover the fee and the $350,000 was payment to settle that suit. This suggests that Mulligan
may have had a contractual claim to an amount beyond quantum meruit. If the court held that
Mulligan was entitled to only the value of his services, then he would have recovered substan-
tially less than $350,000 for his one week's worth of work on the case.
In addition to legal issues about the enforceability of a contract between Schlictmann and
Mulligan, Schlictmann's leaving Reed & Mulligan raises the issue about a lawyer's ethical obli-
gations concerning clients and their files when the lawyer leaves a firm. While Schlictmann et
al.'s parting appears to have been amicable, stories of departing lawyers backing up a moving van
to the firm's office in the dead of night and filling it with client files abound. ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 80-1457 (1980), suggested that in order to
gauge the client's preference on who it wants to represent it-the firm or the departing lawyer-
the departing lawyer could send the client a letter similar to the following letter:
Dear Client:
Effective [date], I became the resident partner in this city of XYZ firm, having with-
drawn from ABC firm. My decision should not be construed as adversely reflecting
in any way my former firm. It is simply one of those things that sometimes happens
in business and professional life.
I want you to be sure there is no disadvantage to you, as the client, from my move.
The decision as to how the matters I have worked on for you are handled and who
handles them in the future will be completely yours, and whatever you decide will be
determinative.
See also Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989); ABA Formal Ethics Op. 99-
414 (1999) (concerning ethical obligations when a lawyer changes firms); State Bar of Cal.
Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct CAL 1985-86 (1985) (concerning ethical
requirements relating to contacts with clients when private law firms dissolve or one or more
attorneys withdraw).
265. HARR, supra note 1, at 454.
266. Id. at 77.
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Subsequently, TLPJ gave "control" of the case to Schlictmann, but
would still receive twelve percent of any settlement (not twelve percent
of the fees earned).267
The arrangement into which TLPJ and Schlictmann entered did
not violate Model Rule 1.5. It is an example of lawyers associating on
a matter, just as Rule 1.5(e) contemplates, each providing professional
services and retaining responsibility for the matter. Under their
agreement, TLPJ and Schlictmann both retained responsibility. Fur-
ther, the clients were probably aware of and consented to this arrange-
ment, as it was Reverend Young who had raised TLPJ's possible
participation in the case at a church meeting.
268
Moreover, TLPJ's fees for the case were probably reasonable.
Even the twelve percent of the settlement amount-that is, the
$648,000 TLPJ demanded-probably would not have been deemed
unreasonable. First, TLPJ was involved in the suit for nearly two and
a half years. Although it appears Schlictmann assumed most of the
risk by disbursing most of the costs early on, the case would not even
have been filed but for TLPJ's involvement. Schlictmann had gone to
Woburn to tell the plaintiffs that resources were not available to pur-
sue the case. It was only after TLPJ became involved that he moved
forward with filing the complaint and pursuing the case. Although he
provided his own expertise on personal injury law in Massachusetts,
Schlictmann relied heavily on Roisman's expertise in complex envi-
ronmental cases.2 69 Even if courts inquired into the reasonableness of
fee divisions, under the circumstances here, TLPJ's fee was not unrea-
sonable.
Consider, however, the hypothetical situation where the recovery
the plaintiffs realized was much larger, say $100,000,000.27' Would it
have then been reasonable for TLPJ to have claimed a fee of twelve
million? Or for that matter, for Mulligan to claim a fee for $4.5 mil-
lion, his one-sixth share of a $28 million fee award? These are merely
questions to be asked, but they could generate an interesting class dis-
cussion of what constitutes a reasonable fee.27'
267. Id. at 142.
268. Id. at 76.
269. Id. at 77, 81.
270. Recall that Professor Nesson suggested that the only way to get the corporations'
attention for having poisoned an entire city was to assess a huge damages award, a year's profit,
which, combined, would amount to over $500 million dollars. Id. at 249- 51.
271. This would also provide a springboard for discussing the recent cases involving huge
fee awards, such as the tobacco litigation and the recovery from Swiss banks of funds that
belonged to Holocaust victims. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text. Further, the
class could explore how the various cities that are currently suing or contemplating suing gun
manufacturers should draft their fee arrangements with the private lawyers with whom many are
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E. The Arrangement Between the Firm and Its Financial Advisers
We are not told many of the details of the business and financial
arrangements between the firm and Gordon and Phillips, the firm's
financial advisors.272 Nevertheless, there are hints that the two firms
may have been involved in a relationship that implicated the ethical
codes' proscriptions against fee-sharing and multidisciplinary prac-
tice. 27
3
For example, we are told that Schlictmann, Conway, Gordon,
and Phillips "became a team," saw each other nearly every day, and
that Conway "rarely accepted a new case until he'd discussed it with
Gordon or Phillips. ' 274  Although they maintained separate offices,
they installed a direct telephone line between their two firms.7
Gordon, Phillips, or both were present at nearly every meeting to dis-
cuss settlement with Grace, 276 and it sometimes appears they lived at
Schlictmann's office.2 7 Although we are told little of how Gordon and
Phillips were compensated, the daydreams Gordon had "of a Palm
Beach villa with a large yacht moored outside and two Mercedes-
Benzes in the garage" after the "$500 million meeting" with Professor
Nesson 27 suggest that Gordon and Phillips would get a percentage of
any recovery rather than be paid on an hourly basis. 9
Model Rule 5.4 is concerned with financial relationships entered
into between lawyers and nonlawyers ° Its title, "Professional Inde-
pendence of a Lawyer," communicates the rationale underlying the
Rule: its provisions are intended to ensure that nonlawyers do not
influence a lawyer's judgment in making the decisions or giving the
advice for which he has responsibility in the client-lawyer relation-
ship.2 1 The concern is that a lay person, who is not subject to the
associating.
272. HARR, supra note 1, at 211-13.
273. See MODEL RULES Rule 5.4(b)-(d); CAL. RULES Rule 1-310, 1-320; MODEL CODE
DR 3-103(A), DR 5-107(B)-(C).
274. HARR, supra note 1, at 211.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 405-48.
277. Harr writes that "for all practical purposes, the Economic Planning Group [Gordon &
Phillips' firm] now functioned as part of Schlictmann's firm." Id.
278. Id. at 250.
279. It is unlikely that a financial planner's hourly fee, regardless of how many hours that
person put in, would be sufficient to fund a villa and yacht!
280. Model Rule 5.4 addresses fee-sharing with nonlawyers. See also CAL. RULES Rule 1-
320. Compare MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(e) and CAL. RULES Rule 2-200, which are concerned
with financial arrangements between lawyers who are not in the same firm. See supra Part VI.A.
281. MODEL RULES Rule 5.4 cmt. 1. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-392 (1995); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility Formal Op. 87-355 (1987).
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same duties a lawyer owes a client, might be more interested in his
own profit rather than the client's welfare.
28 2
Model Rule 5.4 regulates this potential source of influence
through four separate provisions. Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer
from sharing fees with a nonlawyer except in certain circumstances.8 3
Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer forming a partnership with a nonlaw-
yer. Paragraph (c) states that lawyers may not allow a third party who
employs the lawyer or pays the lawyer's fees to direct or influence the
lawyer's judgment in rendering legal services. Finally, paragraph (d)
prohibits a lawyer from practicing law in a professional corporation or
association that practices law for profit if a nonlawyer owns an interest
in the entity, is a director or officer, or has the right to direct or control
the lawyer's decisions in rendering legal services.
As far as we know, Schlictmann's firm never entered into a for-
mal relationship with Gordon and Phillips to form a combined firm,
nor is there any suggestion in the book that they owned an interest in
Schlictmann's firm. Therefore, paragraphs (b) and (d) of Model Rule
5.4 are not applicable. Although Gordon managed the firm's finances,
he did not use his own money to pay the costs and disbursements of
the suit, so paragraph (c) does not apply.2" 4 The only provision that
would be applicable here would appear to be paragraph (a), prohibit-
ing a lawyer from sharing fees with a nonlawyer.
As already noted, it appears that Gordon and Phillips were to
share a percentage fee for their services 285 rather than be paid on an
hourly basis for their advice, as Schlictmann would have compensated
experts and other consultants needed to prepare evidence for trial.
Being paid a percentage fee would constitute fee sharing in violation of
282. See, e.g., Emmons v. State Bar, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-355 (1987).
283. A lawyer may pay money to the estate of a deceased firm lawyer; when purchasing a
practice, a lawyer may pay the purchase price to the estate of a deceased lawyer; and a law firm
can include nonlawyer employees in a profit sharing compensation plan or a retirement plan.
MODEL RULES Rule 5.4(a).
284. This is not entirely true; at one point, Gordon gave his Krugerrands to the banker to
cover loan payments. HARR, supra note 1, at 351. At any rate, paragraph (c) does not place an
absolute prohibition on third party payment for legal services, that is, where a third party pays
the lawyer to represent the client. Common situations involve an insurance company paying a
lawyer to represent an insured or parents paying a lawyer to represent their child. What Model
Rule 5.4(c) prohibits is a lawyer's allowing such a third party to direct the lawyer's representation
of the client. It is hornbook law that in insurance defenses it is not the insurance company but
the insured who is the client to whom the lawyer owes undivided loyalty. See, e.g., Parsons v.
Continental Nat'l Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94 (Ariz. 1976); State Bar of Cal. Comm. on Profes-
sional Responsibility and Conduct CAL 1995-139 (1995).
285. See supra text accompanying note 279.
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paragraph (a). 86 Thus, the arrangement the firm apparently had with
Gordon and Phillips probably violates Model Rule 5.4."27
Nevertheless, a class discussion should not stop here. After all,
Gordon's and Phillips' involvement in nearly all of the Woburn set-
tlement discussions and the strategy sessions during the trial does not
appear to have had any deleterious effect on Schlictmann's decisions.
Schlictmann repeatedly appears to have been at odds not only with
Gordon and Phillips, but also with Conway on a settlement amount.88
Moreover, there is no indication that anyone but Schlictmann had the
final say on what offers or counteroffers would be made to Grace,
subject only to the clients' decision on whether or not to accept a set-
tlement offer from Grace.
In this case, at least, the concerns underlying Rule 5.4 do not
appear to have materialized. Indeed, the proscriptions of Model Rule
5.4 on multidisciplinary practice have been the subject of considerable
disagreement. Commentators have questioned the wisdom of such
prohibitions when a multidisciplinary practice, for example, consisting
286. Compare In re Van Cura, 504 N.W.2d 610 (Wis. 1993) (holding fee splitting unethical
where law firm had financed its litigation with funds from a nonlawyer "consultant," who would
then receive half of fees from such cases) with In re Quintana, 724 P.2d 220 (N.M. 1986) (hold-
ing that it is unethical for lawyer to pay for nonlawyer's investigative services with a percentage
of fee from the case), and Florida Bar v. Shapiro, 413 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1982) (holding that it is
unethical for lawyer to pay nonlawyer employee with salary contingent on the amount of fees
from cases). The assumption that Gordon and Phillips were guaranteed a percentage may not be
correct, based as it is on Gordon's daydreams. See supra text accompanying note 279. It is pos-
sible that rather than expecting a guaranteed percentage of the legal fees, they were anticipating a
generous bonus from Schlictmann, as was his custom with firm employees after a lucrative recov-
ery. Such bonuses, for which there is no guarantee, may not necessarily violate Model Rule
5.4(a)'s prohibition on fee sharing. Cf. CAL. RULES Rule 1-320(B), concerning a lawyer's giving
a gift or gratuity to a nonlawyer for a referral:
A member's offering of or giving a gift or gratuity to any person or entity having
made a recommendation resulting in the employment of the member or the member's
law firm shall not of itself violate this rule, provided that the gift or gratuity was not
offered or given in consideration of any promise, agreement, or understanding that
such a gift or gratuity would be forthcoming or that referrals would be made or
encouraged in the future.
287. Although their apparent fee sharing arrangement would violate Model Rule 5.4, the
same is probably not true of their advice to Conway on which cases to accept. A lawyer is gener-
ally under no obligation to accept a client. But cf. MODEL RULES Rule 6.2; CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6068(h) (1990). Moreover, a lawyer generally does not owe a prospective client any
duties (except not to disclose or use client confidences revealed in the initial consultation), so the
rule's rationale to avoid a nonlawyer's affecting the lawyer's judgment to the detriment of the
client is not implicated. But cf. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(h) (noting that it is a lawyer's
duty "never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself or herself, the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed"); MODEL RULES Rules 6.1-6.4 (encouraging lawyers to become
involved in voluntary pro bono service).
288. See, e.g., HARR, supra note 1, at 408 ("Our bottom line cannot be less than our honest
valuation of the case.").
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of a lawyer and an accountant, could better serve a client's needs.289
Moreover, the American Bar Association appointed a Commission to
investigate the feasibility of amending the Model Rules to allow law-
yers to participate in such multidisciplinary practices (MDPs).
Recently, past ABA President Philip S. Anderson has called the
proposed modifications of the Model Rules to allow MDPs the most
important issue facing the legal profession today.290 In fact, the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice has issued a proposal rec-
ommending that the American Bar Association amend the Model
Rules to permit MDPs, allowing the lawyers to share fees with
nonlawyers.2 91
There is, however, still an active opposition to this proposal, as
evidenced by the numerous comments a preliminary Commission
report and request for comments garnered.292 This is an area of legal
ethics that will remain quite lively. The relationship between the firm
and Gordon and Phillips provides an entry to the important debate on
the advantages and disadvantages of MDPs.
VII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analyses of selected events in A Civil Action dem-
onstrate how the book is a rich resource for supplementing a course in
Professional Responsibility. Whether directly related to or peripheral
to Schlictmann's pursuit of the Woburn case, these events can infuse
the study of legal ethics with an immediacy that a dry class discussion
of the acceptable behavior set forth in the ethical codes cannot. The
lesson learned is that ethics informs each decision a lawyer makes in
representing her client. Using A Civil Action to supplement the course
can impress upon students that legal ethics is not a subject to be
learned in school and discarded upon admission to practice.
The reader should remember, however, that the events I have
analyzed and discussed are simply illustrations of how to use the book
289. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYER-
ING § 5.4:201, at 801 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1998). It appears that Gordon's and Phillips'
involvement in Schlictmann's practice benefited rather than hurt Schlictmann's clients. Gor-
don's financial wizardry enabled him to evaluate settlement offers on the fly and advise Schlict-
mann on whether the offer was as good as it may have sounded. See, e.g., HARR, supra note 1, at
210-11. He was also the person whom Schlictmann relied upon to structure settlements in ways
that might best benefit the clients.
290. ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, General
Information Form (June 8, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpgeninfo.html>.
291. ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates (June 8,
1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalreport.html>.
292. These comments can be accessed at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomreplies.
html>.
[Vol. 23:283
1999] Legal Ethics 349
in a course. They are not intended as an exhaustive survey of ethical
issues in A Civil Action. Many other situations in the book lend them-
selves to a discussion of ethical principles. Moreover, although I have
suggested how a professor can employ some of the illustrations as a
springboard to discussions of more general ethical and professional
concerns, the reader should not feel constrained by those suggestions.
As a class discussion progresses, other avenues worth exploring often
arise. Keeping discussions open-ended and less directed or structured
often triggers students' memories of their own experiences and can
raise class debate to another level. Finally, using A Civil Action will
help emphasize that legal ethics need not take a holiday regardless of
how exhausted a lawyer is or how "right" the cause she represents may
be. Ethical considerations affect a lawyer's entire professional life, and
A Civil Action will help a student understand that.
